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THE CONSTITUTION, THE ROBERTS COURT, AND 
BUSINESS: THE SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS IMPACT OF 
THE 2011–2012 SUPREME COURT TERM 
COREY CIOCCHETTI 
ABSTRACT 
The 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term created quite the media buzz. 
The Affordable Care Act cases and the controversial Arizona immigration 
law dominated the headlines. But the Term also included other fascinating 
yet less sensationalized cases. The Court heard its fair share of criminal 
law controversies involving derelict defense attorneys and prosecutors, as 
well as civil procedure disputes involving qualified immunity for witnesses 
in grand jury proceedings and private parties assisting the government in 
litigation. The Justices also entertained arguments on a federal law 
allowing United States citizens born in Jerusalem to have “Israel” stamped 
as their birthplace on a passport. The Secretary of State refused, arguing 
that the practice would inflame tensions in an already volatile Middle East. 
Another case pitted the First Amendment right to lie about receiving 
military honors against the Stolen Valor Act prohibiting that type of 
dishonest speech. A case from Montana hearkened back to 1889 and im-
plicated the Equal Footing Doctrine—a constitutional provision granting 
territory to states upon entering the Union. Texas crafted new electoral 
maps based on the 2010 census and soon found them scrutinized under the 
Voting Rights Act. In all, the Term was extraordinary because most of its 
cases revolved around topics ripped from the headlines and touched on 
areas of public policy relevant to Americans in 2012 and beyond. 
The Term was also compelling because of its impact on the business 
arena. The Justices granted certiorari in seventeen business cases, eleven 
of which were cherry-picked for this Article. Each case chosen covered a 
classic and well-established business law topic, generated strong interest 
within the business community, contained predominately business-focused 
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facts, and had a connection to a business-related constitutional provi-
sion/amendment or statute. These cases provide the best glimpse into the 
Roberts Court’s most recent stance on topics important to the business 
community. This Article evaluates these cases in depth and proposes the 
following Business Impact Theory of the Term: 
1. The Court’s opinions came out strongly on the side of 
business with business interests receiving sixty-one out of 
seventy potential votes. This resulted in an eighty-seven 
percent success rate for business interests over the course of 
the Term. This high percentage is different from the previous 
Term at the Roberts Court where the Justices unanimously 
voted against business interests in a handful of cases. 
2. These pro-business decisions did not occur in ordinary, run 
of the mill cases. Instead, the impact of these decisions is 
magnified because they each involved topics critical to 
America’s economic recovery. 
3. Perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s liberal-leaning Justices 
voted with the Court’s conservatives twenty-three out of a 
possible thirty-one opportunities—or seventy-four percent 
of the time—in the significant business impact cases. They 
did so in disputes that presented compelling arguments 
from both a conservative and liberal perspective and where 
such facts allowed for a strong four-Justice dissent. Such a 
split, however, occurred only once in the cases considered 
in the tally. 
4. The Court was willing to both narrow and expand constitu-
tional provisions/amendments and state/federal statutes to 
reach its desired result. There appeared to be no concerted 
effort to adhere to a minimalist or living constitutionalist 
philosophy—at least in these significant business impact cases. 
In the end, the results in the business cases of the Term could prove to 
be a fluke, or they could indicate a pivot of the Court towards supporting 
business interests to a greater extent. Time will tell because the next first 
Monday of October is right around the corner. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term was chock-full of interesting 
cases of national importance. The media buzzed over the Affordable Care 
Act arguments and the challenge to Arizona’s controversial immigration 
statute.1 Outrage followed an opinion upholding strip-searches of petty 
offenders arrested and briefly detained in the general prison population.2 
The Court also entertained arguments in other intriguing yet less sensa-
tionalized cases. One case analyzed the relatively unknown Ambassadors 
Clause of the Constitution.3 The issue in that case was whether the Execu-
tive Branch alone had the right to decide if citizens born in Jerusalem may 
list “Israel” as their birthplace on United States passports.4 Congress au-
thorized the practice, but the Secretary of State refused to execute the law 
because of fears it would agitate an increasingly unstable Middle East.5 
The Court decided to step in and referee this inter-branch squabble. An-
other case involved a protestor arrested for violating Vice President Chen-
ey’s personal space.6 The protestor approached within inches of the Vice 
President in a Colorado mall, criticized the administration’s policies on 
Iraq, and slapped him on the shoulder.7 Upon arrest the man told Secret 
Service agents, “[i]f you don’t want other people sharing their opinions, 
you should have him avoid public places,” and later he argued the arrest 
violated his First Amendment right to political speech.8 The Justices also 
heard their fair share of criminal law, immigration, international relations, 
and social issues cases this past Term. One notable criminal law case in-
volved a death penalty inmate whose pro bono lawyers abandoned him 
upon transferring jobs, without informing their client or the court.9 The 
inmate subsequently missed a filing deadline that ended his habeas corpus 
petition, leaving the Court to scold the lawyers by name and fashion a 
remedy for a confessed murderer.10 Election law took its usual place on the 
docket including a Voting Rights Act case scrutinizing Texas’s census-based 
                                                 
1 See infra notes 378–80 and accompanying text. 
2 See Florence v. Bd. of Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513–14 (2012). 
3 See infra note 36. 
4 M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2012). 
5 Id. at 1425. 
6 See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2091–92 (2012). 
7 Id. at 2091. 
8 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Appears to Be Wary Hearing Free-Speech Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at A22. 
9 See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916–17 (2012). 
10 Id. at 918, 922, 924. 
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electoral maps labeled as discriminatory by minority groups.11 The Ninth Cir-
cuit took its usual beating with seventeen of its twenty-four opinions re-
viewed by the Supreme Court reversed.12 
The Term was also compelling because of its impact on the business arena. 
The Justices granted certiorari in seventeen cases that touched on business is-
sues.13 This Article focuses on eleven of those seventeen. These significant 
business impact cases (1) covered classic and well-established business law 
topics, (2) generated interest among the larger business community, (3) con-
tained predominately business-focused facts, and (4) had a strong connection to 
a business-related constitutional provision/amendment or statute. These cases 
provide the best glimpse into the Roberts Court’s most current positions on are-
as important to the business community and comprise the primary focus of this 
Article. The intensive legwork spent evaluating the issues, briefs, oral argu-
ments, and opinions from these eleven cases lead to the following four-pronged 
Business Impact Theory of the 2011–2012 Term: 
1. The Court’s opinions came out strongly on the side of 
business with business interests receiving sixty-one out of 
seventy potential votes.14 This resulted in an eighty-seven 
percent success rate for business interests over the course 
of the Term. This high percentage is different from the 
previous Term at the Roberts Court where the Justices 
                                                 
11 See Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 939–40 (2012). 
12 See Statistics: Circuits: Circuit Report for October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 30, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SB_score
card_OT11_final.pdf. This may partially be due to the fact that the Court granted twenty-
four certiorari petitions from the Ninth Circuit alone and only thirty-nine from the other 
twelve federal circuits combined. Id. (including the Federal Circuit and the District of 
Columbia Circuit). It could also stem from the conspiracy theory that the Court grants 
certiorari petitions from the Ninth Circuit just to reverse a liberal-leaning appellate court. 
See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, U.S. Supreme Court Again Rejects Most Decisions by the 
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com 
/2011/jul/18/local/la-me-ninth-circuit-scorecard-20110718 (stating that it was “another 
bruising year for the liberal judges of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals as the 
Supreme Court overturned the majority of their decisions, at times sharply criticizing 
their legal reasoning”). 
13 See infra Table 1. 
14 The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact 
cases selected this Term but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated above. 
This left eight cases. Barring recusal, illness, or vacancy, nine Justices have votes in each 
case. Multiplying these figures together provides the Justices as a whole with seventy-two 
potential votes (nine Justices multiplied by eight cases). However, Chief Justice Roberts 
recused himself from one and Justice Kagan recused herself from another of the eight cases, 
making the potential vote tally seventy. 
2013] THE CONST., THE ROBERTS COURT, AND BUSINESS 391 
unanimously voted against business interests in a handful 
of cases.15 
2. These pro-business decisions did not occur in ordinary, run 
of the mill cases. Instead, the impact of these decisions is 
magnified because they each involved topics critical to 
America’s economic recovery. 
3. Perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s liberal-leaning Justices16 
voted with the Court’s conservatives twenty-three out of a 
possible thirty-one opportunities—or seventy-four percent 
of the time—in the significant business impact cases.17 
They did so in disputes that presented compelling argu-
ments from both a conservative and liberal perspective and 
where such facts allowed for a strong four-Justice dissent. 
Such a split, however, occurred only once in the cases con-
sidered in the tally.18 
4. The Court was willing to both narrow and expand constitu-
tional provisions/amendments and state/federal statutes to 
reach its desired result. There appeared to be no concerted 
                                                 
15 Michael J. Newhouse, Business Cases and the Roberts Supreme Court, 12 ENGAGE: 
J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, Nov. 2011, at 90, http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib
/20111216_NewhouseEngage12.3.pdf. 
16 This Article classifies (in order of seniority) Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan as the Supreme Court’s liberal-leaning Justices. It classifies (in order of 
seniority) Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito as the Supreme Court’s 
conservative-leaning Justices. Although this topic could be a lengthy article in itself, 
these choices were made based on prior decisions, the rationale behind such decisions, 
the author’s analysis of oral arguments from the Term, and conventional wisdom. See, 
e.g., Dave Gilson, Charts: The Supreme Court’s Rightward Shift, MOTHER JONES (June 
26, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/supreme-court-roberts-obama
care-charts (showing charts depicting the ideology of recent Supreme Court Justices, 
showing that the liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning distinctions drawn in this 
Article are accurate); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Dec-
ades, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html
?pagewanted=all (portraying the conservative nature of the conservative-leaning Justices 
as depicted in this Article). 
17 The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact 
cases selected this Term but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated 
above. This left eight cases and four liberal-leaning Justices with votes in each case. Mul-
tiplying these figures together leads to thirty-two potential votes. However, one of the 
liberal-leaning Justices, Justice Elena Kagan, recused herself from one of the eight cases, 
making the possible vote tally equal thirty-one. 
18 The health care cases resulted in 5-4 split with Chief Justice Roberts joining the 
liberal-leaning Justices to form a majority. However, the health care cases are not included 
in these calculations. 
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effort to adhere to a minimalist or living Constitutionalist 
philosophy—at least in these significant business impact cases. 
This Article evaluates this Business Impact Theory in eight parts. The 
Introduction briefly introduces why analyzing the Supreme Court’s current 
Term from a business perspective is consequential. Part I presents a big 
picture perspective of the entire Term and then hones in on the eleven key 
business cases by running all sixty-nine arguments through a business im-
pact rubric. Digging deeper into the facts, issues, briefs, oral arguments, 
and opinions, Part II evaluates the two intellectual property cases most 
significant to the business arena looking for clues as to the Court’s current 
thinking in this area. Part III does the same while evaluating the Term’s 
three most relevant employment law cases. Part IV continues by analyzing 
the Term’s two most relevant consumer protection cases, while Part V co-
vers the lone, yet significant, securities regulation case on the docket. Part 
VI concludes the line with an analysis of the Affordable Care Act opinion 
and debates whether it should be considered a significant business impact 
case. Part VII forms the theoretical heart of the Article and elaborates on 
the Business Impact Theory introduced above. The last Part concludes. 
I. EVALUATING AND CATEGORIZING THE 2011–2012 SUPREME COURT 
TERM BASED ON BUSINESS IMPACT 
It is critical to take in the 30,000-foot view of the 2011–2012 Supreme 
Court Term before landing on its specific business impact. This Part inves-
tigates both perspectives beginning with the big picture. Part I.A com-
mences by evaluating each of the sixty-nine cases in which the Court en-
tertained oral arguments. This process generates broad categories from 
which the cases most likely to impact business significantly can be identi-
fied. The focus is on the specific issue the Supreme Court has chosen to 
consider (the Question Presented). The goal is to decipher and separate the 
predominant issue in the case from its various sub-issues.19 Cases that 
touch on business issues make the short list while others are removed. 
From there, Part I.B introduces a business impact rubric capable of culling 
                                                 
19 The Court’s answers to the Questions Presented define the precedential limits of its 
opinions and set legal standards for the field. Any discussion outside the limits of the 
Question Presented becomes important, yet non-precedential, dicta. See, e.g., Legal 
Definition of Dicta, LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY, http://www.lectlaw.com/def/d047.htm (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2013) (defining dicta as the “part of a judicial opinion which is merely a 
judge’s editorializing and does not directly address the specifics of the case at bar; 
extraneous material which is merely informative or explanatory”). 
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the short list down to the handful of cases most likely to impact the busi-
ness community significantly. It is not always easy, however, to button-
hole a case by its Question Presented alone. These tougher cases require 
digging into the merits, briefs, and certiorari petitions filed by the parties 
as well as the opinions issued by lower courts to decipher the predominate 
issue. Grinding through this process resulted in all sixty-nine cases being 
slotted into one of twelve categories. 
The twelve categories chosen for analysis are intriguing because they 
are neither lawyer-centric nor couched in legalese. Instead, they touch upon 
the most prevalent economic, social, political issues currently facing the 
United States. This broad, real-world focus has at least two upsides: (1) it 
increases this Article’s appeal and relevance to a larger audience, including 
business professionals, and (2) it provides a comprehensive assessment of 
the Term’s impact on the business arena generally as opposed to its impact 
on an arcane business law topic of interest to the occasional law professor. 
Before conducting this evaluation, the hypothesis was that a select few of 
the Court’s current cases would be relevant enough to society at large to 
merit inclusion into any of these real-world categories; the rest would be too 
obscure or complicated to matter to the average citizen. This hypothesis was 
surprisingly discredited, as each case fell rather neatly into at least one cate-
gory without much in the way of mental gymnastics. Whether this is a coin-
cidence, a mini-representation of the law mirroring society, the Court insert-
ing itself into politics and public policy, or all of the above, is a topic for 
another day. More germane for this Article is an explanation of how this 
evaluation process identified the cases from this Term that are most likely to 
significantly impact the business arena in the near future. To this end, Part 
I.B moves from the big picture, evaluation, and categorization process, and 
considers the business impact rubric governing this culling process. 
A. The 30,000-Foot View of the Court’s 2011–2012 Term 
Beginning at 10:00 AM on the first Monday of October 2011, the Su-
preme Court entertained its first oral arguments of the 2011–2012 Term.20 
                                                 
20 The Court granted certiorari in seventy-four cases but only sixty-nine were argued. 
See Term Snapshot, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2011/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013). The Supreme Court’s oral argument schedule is available 
online in various places. See, e.g., Calendar of Events, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/events/2011-10 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Oral Argument 
Calendar]. The first oral argument was in a case styled Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 975, 978 (2012) (analyzing the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act). The 
second oral argument occurred in three Medicaid reimbursement cases consolidated by 
the Court into one: Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 
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The Justices continued to hear arguments on many Mondays, Tuesdays, and 
Wednesdays well into April 2012.21 The cases attaining a coveted spot on 
the Court’s docket were not randomly selected. When granting certiorari 
from the pool of approximately 10,000 petitions each Term, the Justices se-
lect between 70 and 80 cases22 by looking to 3 primary factors: (1) the na-
tional importance of the Question Presented, (2) the potential to resolve a split 
of opinion in the federal circuit courts (a circuit split), and/or (3) the potential 
for the decision to have important precedential value.23 In addition to qualify-
ing under any or all of these three factors, the so-called Rule of Four re-
quires the vote of at least four Justices to grant a certiorari petition in a par-
ticular case.24 
As much as tradition claims that the Court does not, should not, or is 
unable to think politically when choosing cases, the vast majority of this 
Term’s certiorari petitions involve issues ripped from the headlines and 
percolating in the country’s economic, social, or political realms.25 This 
                                                                                                                         
(2012) (analyzing a California statute reducing Medicaid reimbursements to doctors 
under the preemption doctrine); Douglas v. Cal. Pharm. Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 
(2012) (same); and Douglas v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 
(2012) (same). 
21 See Oral Argument Calendar, supra note 20. 
22 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: General Information, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (stating that 
the “Court receives approximately 10,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari each year. The 
Court grants and hears oral argument in about 75–80 cases.”). 
23 See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov
/EducationalResources/ConstitutionResources/SeparationOfPowers/USSupremeCourtPro
cedures.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Supreme Court Procedures]. 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Justice Scalia Is a Political Star—and That’s Bad for 
the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012102923.html (“Justices clearly can 
make mistakes. Few can resist public adoration. However, as they [sic] justices yield to 
that temptation, citizens may find it hard to accept the finality of their decisions. If 
justices merely carry the torch for their political allies, law becomes little more than a 
part of politics.”); Can the Supreme Court Be Neutral?, HISTORY LEARNING SITE, http://
www.historylearningsite.co.uk/supreme_court_neutral.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
In order for America to be a democracy the judiciary, i.e. the Supreme 
Court, needs to be independent and a-political. If not then what is good 
for the people and for America may be ignored in favour of judgements 
that favour a particular political Party or viewpoint. In the 18th Century 
when the Founding Fathers were first writing the Constitution, they 
must have intended for the Supreme Court to be a-political, in order for 
it to fit into their new democracy, however, it is debatable whether or 
not a Supreme Court that is appointed by the President, can ever truly 
be independent from political influences. 
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reality makes it difficult not to analyze the Court’s cases via a public poli-
cy lens. After much research, an online survey of voter preferences for the 
upcoming presidential election proved to be the most accurate, concise, and 
representative model of America’s most relevant and current public policy 
issues.26 The survey asked a series of policy questions, evaluated responses, 
and advised users about which 2012 presidential candidate (or primary chal-
lenger) would be most compatible with their interests.27 Dissecting these sur-
vey questions yields the twelve categories most important to Americans’ fa-
milial, social, and work lives.28 Therefore, this Article uses these same 
categories to sort each case from the 2011–2012 Term: 
1. The economy;29 
2. Taxes, entitlement programs,30 and government spending;31 
3. Military intervention and terrorism;32 
                                                                                                                         
Id.; see also McCain: Supreme Court Ignorant on Politics, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2012, 9:56 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500202_162-57352743/mccain-supreme-court-igno 
rant-on-politics/ (“Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) says the U.S. Supreme Court showed its 
‘ignorance’ about politics in its landmark Citizens United ruling.”) (emphasis added). 
26 See, e.g., 2012 Presidential Candidate Selector, SELECTSMART.COM, http://www 
.selectsmart.com/president/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) [hereinafter SELECTSMART]. 
27 This survey concludes by identifying the user’s best option, based on submitted 
answers to questions based on these twelve categories, between the candidates who 
entered the 2012 presidential race (and which is now purely academic for the 2012 
presidential election): “Barack Obama, Buddy Roemer, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Kent 
Mesplay, Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Robby Wells, Rocky Anderson, 
Ron Paul, Stewart Alexander, Donald Trump, Herman Cain, Jon Huntsman, Joseph 
Biden, Michael Bloomberg, Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry and Tim Pawlenty.” Id. 
28 Id. 
29 The economy is impacted by most of the cases on the 2011–2012 docket. 
Therefore, this Article assigns each case to a more specific category. That said, the 
Court’s bankruptcy cases most appropriately fall under the topic of the economy more 
generally and do not easily fall into any of the other eleven categories. The Court heard 
two bankruptcy law cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See Hall v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 1882, 1885 (2012) (analyzing whether proceeds from the sale of a family farm are 
“incurred by the estate” under a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code); RadLAX v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2068 (2012) (analyzing whether a debtor may 
pursue a bankruptcy plan under Chapter 11 proposing to sell assets free of liens without 
allowing the secured creditor to bid). 
30 The Court heard one trust and estates case during the 2011–2012 Term. See Astrue 
v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025–26 (2012) (analyzing the Social Security 
Administration’s interpretation about whether to allow children conceived after their 
father’s death to qualify for survivor benefits under the Social Security Act). 
31 The Court heard one tax case during the 2011–2012 Term. See United States v. 
Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012) (analyzing the statute of 
limitations the Internal Revenue Service operates under when it attempts to assess a 
deficiency against a taxpayer based on a misstated basis from the sale of real property). 
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4. Balancing civil liberties and national security;33 
5. Business34 and employment35 (particularly job creation, mini-
mum wage, and unemployment insurance); 
                                                                                                                         
32 The Court heard one case at least tangentially covering the military and terrorism 
during the 2011–2012 Term. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 
(2012) (analyzing whether the term “individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act 
allows torture victims to sue individual people or organizations as well). 
33 The Court heard one privacy-related case during the 2011–2012 Term. See United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (addressing whether a police placement of a 
GPS tracking device underneath a suspect’s car without a warrant constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
34 The business category, as is relevant to the 2011–2012 Term, includes subcategories 
such as: securities law, consumer protection and intellectual property cases. The Court 
heard one securities law case during the 2011–2012 Term. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) 
L.L.C. v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417 (2012) (analyzing the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and its statute of limitations for suing executives and other insiders for short swing 
trades). The Court heard two consumer protection cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See 
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2037–38 (2012) (analyzing whether the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act prevents real estate settlement servicers from 
charging an unearned fee in certain situations); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. 
Ct. 665, 668 (2012) (analyzing the non-waivable “right to sue” provision of the Credit 
Repair Organizations Act and whether a mandatory arbitration, as opposed to an actual trial, 
falls under its scope). The Court heard four intellectual property cases during the 2011–
2012 Term. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1693–94 (2012) (analyzing a patent 
applicant’s ability to produce new evidence in front of a district court when challenging a 
denial by the Patent and Trademark Office); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 
132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675–76 (2012) (evaluating a fight between a generic and brand name 
drug manufacturer under the counterclaim provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290 (2012) (analyzing 
whether a proposed patent is too similar to a law of nature to be valid); Golan v. Holder, 
132 S. Ct. 873, 877–78 (2012) (analyzing the federal government’s decision, as part of 
joining an international copyright convention, to grant new copyright protection to orphan 
works in the public domain). 
35 The Court heard seven employment law cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760, 760 (2012) (showing grant of 
certiorari petition in a case analyzing the Fair Labor Standards Act and its outside salesperson 
exemption in relation to pharmaceutical salespeople); Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 132 S. Ct. 
1327, 1332 (2012) (analyzing the Family and Medical Leave Act’s self-care provision and 
collision with a state’s sovereign immunity); Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 
1353–54 (2012) (analyzing the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and when 
a disabled employee is “newly awarded compensation” for statutory purposes); Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2012) (analyzing 
the Ministerial Exception to the First Amendment and its application to employment 
discrimination laws); Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 684 (2012) 
(analyzing the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and an employee’s injury on land outside of 
covered territory); Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 453, 453 (2012) (showing grant 
of certiorari petition in a case analyzing the Civil Service Reform Act and constitutional 
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6. Global trade and international relations;36 
7. Social issues—particularly: (1) abortion, (2) marijuana legali-
zation, (3) stem cell research, (4) same sex marriage, (5) speech 
and other constitutional amendments37 and provisions,38 
                                                                                                                         
claims for equitable relief); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 131 S. Ct. 3061, 
3061 (2011) (showing grant of certiorari petition in a case involving the notice used to collect 
mandatory union assessments used for political and ideological purposes). 
36 Native American/Tribal law constitutes a segment of global trade and relations be-
tween sovereigns. This Term, the Court heard three cases involving Native American/Tribal 
law with two of these cases (Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchakwas and Salazar v. Patchak) consolidated together by the Supreme Court bringing 
the total number in this area to two. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2202–03 (2012) (analyzing whether the Quiet Title Act 
applies to all suits concerning land in which the United States claims an interest); Salazar v. 
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2203 (2012) (analyzing whether federal law waives the sovereign 
immunity of the United States from a suit challenging its title to lands that it holds in trust 
for an Indian Tribe); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 995, 995 (2012) 
(showing grant of certiorari petition in a case analyzing whether the federal government is 
required to pay contract support costs incurred by a tribal contractor under the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act where Congress has imposed a statutory cap 
on the appropriations applicable to such costs and the costs exceed the cap). Additionally, 
the Court heard M.B.Z. v. Clinton, a case on a miscellaneous constitutional statutory pro-
vision, the Receive Ambassadors Clause, which has the potential to alter global trade and 
international relations (at least according to the Secretary of State who is a party in the 
case). See M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–25 (2012) (analyzing whether a statute 
allowing United States citizens born in Jerusalem to place “Israel” on their passports as a 
birthplace is a political question that must be worked out between the Legislative and 
Executive branches). 
37 The Court heard four cases covering Constitutional Amendments (in particular the 
First, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments) during the 2011–2012 Term. 
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2311 (2012) (involving 
whether the Federal Communication Commission’s indecency enforcement regime 
violates the First or Fifth Amendments); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012) 
(analyzing whether an inmate in a prison run by a private contractor could sue for an 
Eighth Amendment violation when he had adequate state lawsuit options); Armour v. 
City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2077 (2012) (analyzing, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, whether a local taxing authority must refund payments made by people paying a 
sewer system improvement assessment in full, while forgiving the obligations of 
identically situated taxpayers who opted into a multi-year installment payment plan); 
FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1446 (2012) (analyzing whether suits for mental and 
emotional distress under the Privacy Act of 1974 may abrogate a state’s Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity where the statute allows such immunity to be abrogated 
in cases involving “actual damages”). 
38 The Court heard seven Supremacy Clause/preemption cases during the 2011–2012 
Term; three of these cases (styled with the name Douglas as the petitioner) were 
consolidated into one bringing the total to Supremacy Clause/preemption cases to five. 
See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 (2012) 
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(6) crime,39 justice,40 and capital punishment, (7) climate 
change, and (8) gun control; 
                                                                                                                         
(analyzing a California statute reducing Medicaid reimbursements to doctors under the 
preemption doctrine); Douglas v. Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 
(2012) (same); Douglas v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 (2012) 
(same); Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 968 (2012) (analyzing whether the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act preempts, by its terms, a California law regulating the 
treatment of non-ambulatory pigs at federally inspected slaughterhouses); Kurns v. R.R. 
Friction Prods., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (2012) (analyzing whether the Locomotive 
Inspection Act preempts Pennsylvania state design, defect, and failure to warn tort 
claims); PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 131 S. Ct. 3019, 3019 (2011) (showing grant of 
the certiorari petition in a case analyzing whether the federal government or the state of 
Montana owns riverbeds in three rivers running through Montana based on the Equal 
Footing Doctrine based on Article I, Section III of the Constitution, which reads: “New 
States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed 
or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the 
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures 
of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2497 (2012) (analyzing the state of Arizona’s attempt, in four provisions of a state 
law, to co-enforce federal immigration law). 
39 The Court heard twenty-five criminal cases during the 2011–2012 Term—eight of 
which (Missouri v. Frye with Lafler v. Cooper, Holder v. Gutierrez with Holder v. 
Sawyers, Miller v. Alabama with Jackson v. Hobbes, and Dorsey v. United States with 
Hill v. United States) were consolidated into four by the Supreme Court, reducing the 
total number of criminal cases to twenty-one. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 
2460 (2012) (analyzing the imposition of a life without parole sentence, under the Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, on a juvenile who was fourteen 
years old at the time of the offense); Jackson v. Hobbes, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) 
(same); Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2325–26 (2012) (analyzing a case 
under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and whether it applies to all defendants sentenced 
after its enactment); Hill v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2325–26 (2012) (same); S. 
Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348–49 (2012) (analyzing the imposition of 
criminal fines); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2091 (2011) (involving political 
speech and a confrontation with Vice President Cheney, which led to an arrest); Williams 
v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012) (analyzing the Confrontation Clause and whether 
it requires the presence at trial of experts who analyze DNA evidence); Blueford v. 
Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2048 (2012) (analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause and a 
situation where a jury deadlocks on a lesser included offense); Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. 
Ct. 1826, 1829–30 (2012) (analyzing whether courts of appeal may raise deliberately 
forfeited timeliness issues on their own initiative); Florence v. Bd. of Freeholders, 132 S. 
Ct. 1510, 1513–14 (2012) (authorizing routine strip searches for people arrested and held 
in jail awaiting case processing); Vasquez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1532, 1532 (2012) 
(dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted after oral argument in a case 
analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant’s counsel publicly stated 
that the defendant would lose the case); Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1466 
(2012) (analyzing a federal judge’s decision to hand down a concurrent or consecutive 
sentence when a state trial court has not yet handed down its sentence for the same 
crime); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1382–83 (2012) (analyzing plea offers and the 
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8. Health care;41 
9. Environment and property rights;42 
10. Immigration;43 
                                                                                                                         
ineffective assistance of counsel); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012) 
(analyzing plea offers and the ineffective assistance of counsel); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. 
Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012) (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel); Martel v. Clair, 132 S. 
Ct. 1276, 1281 (2012) (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel); Messerschmidt v. 
Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1240–41 (2012) (analyzing qualified immunity for police 
officers based off of an unreasonable search warrant); Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 
1185 (2012) (analyzing custodial interrogations); Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 
978 (2012) (analyzing registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act); Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916 (2012) (analyzing ineffective 
assistance of counsel); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012) (analyzing 
reliability of eyewitness testimony under due process); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 
646 (2012) (analyzing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and certificates of 
appealability); Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629–30 (2012) (analyzing prosecutorial 
obligations to turn certain evidence over to the defense prior to trial); Greene v. Fisher, 132 
S. Ct. 38, 42 (2011) (analyzing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act). 
40 The Court heard five cases relating to the justice system and civil procedure during 
the 2011–2012 Term. See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536, 2536 (2012) 
(dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in a case analyzing whether a 
private purchaser of real estate settlement services has standing to sue under Article III, 
Section 2 of the Constitution); Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 1999–
2000 (2012) (analyzing the costs that may be awarded to prevailing parties in federal 
lawsuits when it comes to the compensation of interpreters); Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 
1657, 1660 (2012) (analyzing whether a private citizen working for the government part-
time has qualified immunity); Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1500 (2012) (examining 
the type of immunity granted to a grand jury witness); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 132 S. 
Ct. 740, 744–45 (2012) (analyzing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and whether its 
provisions deprive federal courts of federal question jurisdiction). 
41 The Court heard three health care and government services cases during the 2011–
2012 Term. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 
(2012) (analyzing whether Congress had the power under Article I of the Constitution to 
pass the Affordable Care Act health insurance mandate/minimum care provision and 
whether the case is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act as a tax passed by Congress but not 
yet collected); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) 
(analyzing whether the Affordable Care Act’s health care mandate/minimum care 
provision may be severed from the rest of the Act if the mandate/minimum care provision 
itself is found unconstitutional); Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 
2546, 2601 (2012) (analyzing whether the federal government is coercing the states to 
accept terms of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid provisions). 
42 The Court heard one environmental/property rights case during the 2011–2012 Term. 
See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369 (2012) (analyzing whether citizen petitioners may 
bring an Administrative Procedure Act claim to challenge an administrative compliance order 
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act). 
43 The Court heard five immigration cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See Holder v. 
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2014–15 (2012) (analyzing whether an alien seeking cancellation 
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11. Elections (particularly voter registration);44 and 
12. Ethics (particularly the virtue of honesty).45 
Table 1 summarizes the cases as sorted into one of the twelve categories 
supra.46 Note that the business topics are broken down further into the sub-
categories of: (1) intellectual property; (2) employment; (3) consumer pro-
tection; (4) securities regulation; and (5) health care because these are the 
dominant issues in the significant business impact cases chosen for analysis 
in Parts III–VII.47 The social issues cases are also broken down into subcat-
egories to display a more accurate picture of the Term (note: social issues 
topics comprised thirty-five of the sixty-nine argued cases).48 
                                                                                                                         
of removal may rely on parent’s years of residence); Holder v. Sawyers, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 
2014–15 (2012) (same; decided together with Holder v. Gutierrez); Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. 
Ct. 1479, 1483–84 (2012) (analyzing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act and its retroactivity); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1170 (2012) 
(analyzing whether filing false tax returns counts as a deportable “aggravated felony” for 
purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 
(2011) (analyzing a relief from deportation proceeding under an immigration law that has 
since been repealed). 
44 The Court heard three election law cases during the 2011–2012 Term; all three cases 
were consolidated into one. See Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 393–40 (2012) (analyzing 
whether a district court judge, in drawing interim election maps for the 2012 election, 
adhered to the correct standards); Perry v. Davis, 132 S. Ct. 934, 393–40 (2012) (same). 
45 The Court heard one case that directly implicated the virtue of honesty. See United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012) (analyzing whether the Stolen Valor 
Act—criminalizing false representations by a person claiming to have been awarded any 
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States—is 
invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
46 Although many cases could slot into more than one category, this Article chose the 
predominate topic for the classification process. For instance, the Arizona immigration 
case—styled Arizona v. United States—is an immigration law as well as a Supremacy 
Law/preemption case. An evaluation of the case facts and the opinion below, however, lead 
this Article to classify the issue as a Supremacy Clause/preemption case. See, e.g., Lyle 
Denniston, Argument Preview: Who Controls Immigrants’ Lives?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 20, 
2012, 2:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=143506 (advancing the Supremacy Clause 
as the key issue in the case and stating “[a]t issue before the Justices is the enforceability at 
this stage of those four provisions [of the Arizona law]. If the Court concludes that—as 
written—they would unconstitutionally conflict with federal law or disrupt federal 
enforcement, it would not allow them to take effect. If it finds that they have no such impact 
on federal law or enforcement, it would let Arizona start enforcing them.”). 
47 Because of the varied topics involved in the social issues cases, each one is also 
broken down into subcategories to add clarity to the table. 
48 See infra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
CATEGORIZATION OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED OVER THE SUPREME COURT’S 
2011–2012 TERM 
Case Classification (significant business impact cases in italics) Cases 
Social Issues: Crime (Justice, Capital Punishment | Civil Liberties vs. 
National Security) 22 
Social Issues: Justice System (specifically Civil Procedure, Immunity, 
and Evidence) 8 
Business: Employment 7 
Immigration 4 
Social Issues: Constitutional Provisions (Supremacy Clause | Equal 
Footing Doctrine) 4 
Taxes, Government Services, and Entitlement Programs  4 
Business: Consumer Protection 3 
Business: Health Care 3 
Business: Intellectual Property 3 
Trade and International Relations: Native American and Tribal Law | 
Ambassadors Clause 3 
Economy: Bankruptcy 2 
Business: Securities 1 
Elections (specifically voter rights) 1 
Environmental and Property Rights 1 
Ethics (Stolen Valor Act) 1 
Military Intervention and Terrorism 1 
Social Issues: Constitutional Amendment Interpretation (specifically the 
First, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments) 1 
Total Merits Cases on Docket 69 
Total Business Cases on Docket 17 
Total Significant Business-Impact Cases 8 
 
This big picture perspective concludes here with a brief summary of re-
sults of this categorization process. Crime, justice, punishment, and civil 
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liberties/national security are major social issues in the United States today.49 
Therefore, it may be appropriate that this category took up the most space 
on the docket with twenty-two argued cases.50 Many of these cases 
stemmed from habeas corpus petitions filed in federal courts after the ex-
haustion of an inmate’s state criminal post-conviction relief.51 Habeas peti-
tions constitute the last legal recourse for inmates before their sentence is 
carried out in full (sometimes in the form of capital punishment).52 This re-
ality explains the plethora of certiorari grants and arguments in habeas cas-
es. The handful of other criminal cases dealt with the right to “effective” 
counsel and downright awful performances by defense attorneys in criminal 
cases.53 Prosecutors took some heat as well for withholding important evi-
dence from a defendant prior to trial.54 
The next most popular topics with the Court were civil procedure (eight 
arguments), employment law (seven arguments), immigration (four argu-
ments), constitutional provisions such as the Supremacy Clause (four argu-
ments), and taxes, government services, and entitlement programs (four ar-
guments) categories.55 The highest profile case of that bunch—Arizona v. 
United States—came from the constitutional provisions category and in-
volved the state of Arizona, fed up with what it believed to be the slow pace 
of federal enforcement, passing legislation designed to co-enforce federal 
immigration law over the objection of the Obama administration.56 Other 
interesting immigration cases involved removal proceedings for aliens con-
victed of crimes unrelated to their immigration status but now facing re-
moval because of the convictions.57 The justice system cases involved qual-
ified immunity from lawsuits—either for grand jury witnesses or for private 
employees assisting a short-staffed government legal team as counsel.58 
As always, the First (Speech and Religion Clauses), Fifth (Due Process 
Clause), Eleventh (State Sovereign Immunity Clause), and Fourteenth 
(Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses) Amendments had a prominent 
seat at the table.59 The Free Speech Clause was by far the most litigated 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Social Issues: Crime and Punishment, THE WEEK, http://theweek.com 
/supertopic/topic/272/crime-and-punishment (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
50 See supra Table 1. 
51 See supra note 39. 
52 Habeas Corpus, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Aug. 15, 2010, 5:17 PM), http://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus. 
53 See supra note 39. 
54 Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012). 
55 See supra Table 1. 
56 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497–98 (2011). 
57 See supra note 43. 
58 See supra note 40. 
59 See supra note 37. 
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Constitutional Amendment of the Term. One speech case involved employ-
ees advocating their right not to speak in unison with their union by being 
forced to fund a political “fight back” campaign against anti-union Califor-
nia state ballot measures.60 Another speech case involved television and ra-
dio stations agitated by restrictions on what the government claimed was 
“indecent” content.61 Although health care dominated the national news and 
generated extended oral argument time, the three Affordable Care Act cases 
comprised only four percent of the docket.62 Four percent or not, these opin-
ions are sure to impact tens of millions of Americans and generate conver-
sation for decades to come. 
In an interesting twist, the so-called War on Terror, including military 
law and detainee rights, made only one appearance in a case concerning 
torture victim’s rights, or lack thereof as the Court held, to sue certain in-
dividuals with a hand in their torture.63 A few miscellaneous cases stole 
the show when it came to intrigue and interesting legal issues. Along with 
the federal law allowing Israel to be stamped as a birthplace on a passport 
(mentioned in the Introduction), the Stolen Valor Act made news when a 
citizen and board member of a county water district was punished for ly-
ing about receiving military honors when, in actuality, he served no time 
in the military.64 The Court considered whether the law violated a person’s 
First Amendment right to lie.65 Montana argued that it owned riverbeds on 
three major rivers flowing through its territory based on the Equal Footing 
Doctrine applicable the day Montana joined the Union in 1889.66 In tough 
economic times, state ownership of the riverbeds would allow Montana to 
tax companies operating businesses on its rivers.67 Federal ownership 
would leave the state coffers high and dry, so to speak.68 While this big 
picture look at the Court’s Term could comprise a stand-alone article, this 
Article is more focused on the cases most likely to impact business. The 
culling of these cases from the whole described in this overview is the 
subject of the next Section. 
                                                 
60 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284–85 (2012). 
61 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2311–12 (2012). 
62 See supra Table 1. 
63 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012). 
64 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012). 
65 Id. 
66 See Thomas Merrill, Opinion Analysis: Montana Dunked on Riverbeds, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Feb. 23, 2012, 11:03 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=139571. 
67 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1222 (2012). 
68 Id. 
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B. Culling Cases with Potential to Impact the Business Arena 
The Roberts Court tends to grant certiorari in more business-related cas-
es than its predecessor Rehnquist Court.69 Therefore, it is somewhat shock-
ing to find such a small array of academic papers and popular press articles 
analyzing the impact of a specific Supreme Court Term on the business are-
na.70 This Section joins the conversation by implementing a business-impact 
rubric designed to cull out the cases with the best chance of significantly 
impacting the business arena. The rubric is designed to identify cases where, 
for example, the Court’s decision lessens the burden for plaintiffs in securi-
ties cases to sue corporate insiders, or where the Court’s opinion limits 
causes of action designed to protect consumers in real estate or credit trans-
actions. To do so the rubric asks the following four questions: 
1. Does the Question Presented cover a classic and well-
established business law topic? 
2. Has at least one business or business interest group filed a 
“friend of the Court” (amicus curiae) brief demonstrating a 
serious interest in the case? 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Michael Orey, The Supreme Court: Open for Business, BUSINESSWEEK (July 
8, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_28/b4042040.htm (“The true 
sea change brought about by the Roberts court stems from its willingness to take business 
cases for review. The group presided over by his predecessor, William H. Rehnquist, 
simply wasn’t interested, instead favoring cases involving criminal law, school prayer, or 
other matters involving fundamental constitutional rights.”). 
70 Twenty-seven articles arose in a Lexis search over the past five years using the words 
“Supreme Court and Business” in the title. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Business-Like: The 
Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Labor and Employment Decisions, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 207 (2010); Daniel E. Troy & Rebecca K. Wood, Federal Preemption at the 
Supreme Court, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257 (2008). It is important to note that 
these articles pick a specific business topic, such as employment or preemption, and analyze 
the Court’s cases on that front. In addition, only a few popular press articles arose using the 
same search terms. See, e.g., Case by Case: The U.S. Supreme Court 2011–2012 Term, 
REUTERS.COM, http://www.reuters.com/supreme-court/2011-2012 (last visited Mar. 23, 
2013) [hereinafter REUTERS] (classifying, without much business impact analysis, each of 
the cases docketed this Term); Melissa Maleske, 6 More Supreme Court Cases That Matter 
to Businesses, INSIDE COUNSEL (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/11/01
/6-more-supreme-court-cases-that-matter-to-business (discussing six cases likely to have 
business impact, four of which make the cut in this Article); Eric Markowitz, 5 Supreme 
Court Cases Entrepreneurs Should Watch, INC.COM (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.inc.com
/articles/201110/5-supreme-court-cases-entrepreneurs-should-watch.html (discussing five 
cases from the 2011–2012 Term that are of interest to entrepreneurs); Newhouse, supra 
note 15 (discussing the Roberts’s Court and its orientation to business). Interestingly, none 
of the five cases Inc.com finds of interest to entrepreneurs make the cut for business impact 
based on the rubric in this Article. 
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3. Do business-focused facts dominate the case, or are the 
business focused-facts on its periphery? 
4. Does a business-focused constitutional provision or amend-
ment or a state or federal statute dominate in the case? 
Each of the sixty-nine argued cases from the Term were inputted into 
this rubric. In the end, eleven cases (nearly sixteen percent of the docket) 
were culled from the list for further analysis in Parts III–VII. This Section 
concludes with a brief breakdown of each of the four rubric inputs. 
1. Input Factor #1: Does the Question Presented Address a Classic 
and Well-Established Business Law Topic? 
Business Law is a topic covered in law school and undergraduate 
business curricula across the country. This is, in part, because the business 
school accreditation body (the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools 
of Business) looks for accreditation purposes at whether an institution in-
cludes business law courses in its curriculum.71 Topics covered in text-
books for survey business law courses are relatively standard across insti-
tutions and allow for an accurate gauge of what the academy considers 
important subjects. This Article employs: (1) these prominent business law 
textbooks combined with (2) topic lists from nationally recognized busi-
ness law education associations and (3) the author’s extensive experience 
teaching the subject to whittle down this universe to a list of twenty classic 
and well-established business law topics.72 
                                                 
71 Business Accreditation Standards: Scope of Accreditation, AACSB, http://www.aac
sb.edu/accreditation/business/standards/scope.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“For the 
purpose of determining inclusion in AACSB Accreditation, the following will be con-
sidered ‘traditional business subjects’ ... Business Law ....”). 
72 Law school casebooks are too focused on specific areas of business law, such as 
corporation law or tax law, to be helpful. This makes it tough to cull generalized categories 
of business law from their tables of contents. Therefore, business law textbooks prove to be 
the more appropriate vehicle for this analysis. See, e.g., HENRY CHEESEMAN, Contents, 
CONTEMPORARY BUSINESS AND ONLINE COMMERCE LAW (7th ed. 2012), available at 
http://www.pearsoned.co.uk/bookshop/detail.asp?item=100000000422737; KENNETH W. 
CLARKSON, ET AL., Table of Contents, BUSINESS LAW: TEXT AND CASES (11th ed. Cengage 
Learning) (2008), available at http://www.cengage.com/search/productOverview.do?N=+16
+4294922239+4294966221+4294950417&Ntk=P_Isbn13&Ntt=9780324655223#Ta
bleofContents; RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, Table of Contents, SMITH AND 
ROBERSON’S BUSINESS LAW (15th ed. 2011), available at http://www.cengage.com/search
/productOverview.do?Ntt=13109640763068193154555477591824670257&N=16+42949224
53+167&Ntk=P_EPI; ROGER LEROY MILLER, Table of Contents, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
BUSINESS LAW: SUMMARIZED CASES (9th ed. 2008), available at http://www.cengage.com
/search/productOverview.do?N=16&Ntk=P_Isbn13&Ntt=9781111530624; see also Business 
 
406 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:385 
TABLE 2 
TWENTY CLASSIC AND WELL-ESTABLISHED BUSINESS LAW TOPICS73 
Administrative Law E-Commerce | Technology 
Antitrust Employment: Relationships | Discrimination | Agency 
Business Associations: Corporations | 
LLCs | Et cetera Environmental Law 
Civil Procedure: Courts | Jurisdiction Intellectual Property 
Constitutional Law International Law 
Consumer Protection Property 
Contracts: Performance | Breach Sales | Negotiable Instruments | Secured Transactions 
Creditors’ Rights | Bankruptcy Securities Regulation 
Criminal Law | Cyber Crimes Torts | Strict Liability | Products Liability 
Dispute Resolution Trusts | Estates 
 
A case receives credit for Input Factor #1 if its Question Presented revolves 
around one of these classic business law topics. Amazingly, fifty-five out of 
sixty-nine (nearly eighty percent) of the cases from the 2011–2012 Term 
passed this initial screen.74 This demonstrates both the prevalence of business 
law topics on the Court’s docket and perhaps the overbroad focus of today’s 
business law curricula (another topic outside the scope of this Article). Of 
course, an analysis of fifty-five cases only marginally related to business does 
not make for a satisfying undertaking of the Term’s significant impact on the 
business arena. Therefore, one hurdle alone does not merit a case’s inclusion on 
the list. At least three more hurdles also exist. 
                                                                                                                         
Law, NATIONAL BUSINESS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.nbea.org/newsite/curri
culum/standards/law.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (listing its formulation of classic 
business law topics). 
73 There are many topics sporadically covered in the business law textbooks and 
literature that might have made the list such as the following: Ethics and Business Decision 
Making, Election Law, Government Law, Health Care Law, Immigration Law, Insurance 
Law, Native American/Tribal Law, Professional Liability, and Tax Law. See, e.g., MILLER, 
supra note 72 (listing “Liability of Accountants and Other Professionals” and “Ethics and 
Business Decision Making” in its Table of Contents). These topics are not as widely taught 
in the field and, therefore, not considered as classic business law topics for this rubric. 
74 See infra Appendix, Table 15. 
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2. Input Factor #2: Were Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed by Businesses or 
Business Interest Groups? 
Interested parties often file amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme 
Court.75 Amicus briefs are directed at specific cases and bring to the 
Court’s attention “relevant matter not already brought to its attention by 
the parties [that] may be of considerable help to the Court.”76 The Justices 
have the option of ignoring these briefs completely or reading and poten-
tially availing themselves of them during oral argument or in a written 
opinion. In the end, amicus briefs do matter and although “they rarely, if 
ever, make or break a case[,] ... they’re most effective when they succinct-
ly point out potential long-term consequences that the court might not oth-
erwise recognize.”77 Justice Stephen Breyer, in an important abortion 
rights case, claimed that amicus briefs played an “important role in educat-
ing judges on potentially relevant technical matters, helping to make us, 
not experts but educated laypersons, and thereby helping to improve the 
quality of our decisions.”78 
Amicus briefs filed on behalf of businesses or business-interest groups 
help demonstrate the importance of a specific case to the business com-
munity. This Article defines business interest groups as including any type of 
business association, including trade associations or political action commit-
tees, with a mission statement advocating for issues important to the business 
community or the fair treatment of business. An appropriate example of a 
business interest group is the United States Chamber of Commerce. The 
USCC is the world’s largest business federation that represents over three 
million businesses; the organization even operates a litigation wing that “ad-
vocates for fair treatment of business in the courts and before regulatory 
agencies.”79 Over the past year, the USCC filed dozens of amicus briefs in 
pending Supreme Court and federal appeals court cases.80 The USCC is not 
                                                 
75 SUP. CT. R. 37. 
76 Id. 
77 Brenden Koerner, Do Judges Read Amicus Curiae Briefs, SLATE MAGAZINE (Apr. 
1, 2003, 6:22 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2003/04
/do_judges_read_amicus_curiae_briefs.html. 
78 Id. (referring to Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)). 
79 See About U.S. Chamber Small Business Nation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
SMALL BUS. NATION, http://www.uschambersmallbusinessnation.com/about-us/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 23, 2013); About NCLC, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE NATIONAL CHAMBER 
LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/?n=bd (last visited Mar. 23, 
2013) (“The National Chamber Litigation Center (NCLC) is the public policy law firm of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.”). 
80 See Recent Case Activity, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE NATIONAL CHAMBER 
LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
408 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:385 
alone, however, in its interest in Supreme Court cases. Organizations as var-
ied as General Electric, the National Federation of Independent Business 
Small Business Legal Center, and the National Association of Realtors also 
filed at least one amicus brief with the Court during the 2011–2012 Term.81 
Running this factor through the rubric resulted in twenty-five cases with at 
least one business-based brief filed with the Court.82 More importantly, after 
combining input factors #1 and #2, only twenty potential business-impact 
cases remain in the mix. 
3. Input Factor #3: Do Business-Focused Facts Predominate? 
Many cases that reach the Supreme Court are complex and revolve around 
multiple sets of facts and legal issues. The Affordable Care Act case presents a 
perfect example.83 This case is based predominately on health care and Con-
gress’s attempt to provide a minimum baseline of health insurance to more 
Americans.84 But the case also encompasses other topics such as business 
(Commerce Clause, interstate commerce and the individual mandate that the 
vast majority of Americans purchase health care), entitlement programs (Medi-
care and Medicaid changes under the Affordable Care Act), and tax law (the 
relevance of the Anti-Injunction Act—a federal law disallowing tax challengers 
before the tax is collected).85 Part VII discusses this case more specifically and 
whether it should be considered a case where business facts predominate. 
Because so many Supreme Court cases merely touch on the business 
arena, this input factor requires rummaging through the factual scenario of 
each case to determine whether a business-focused set of facts predomi-
nates. Over this Term, business-focused facts predominated in cases that 
involved commercial transactions for products and services, consumers, 
employment relationships and discrimination, securities trades, and/or intel-
lectual property.86 This third hurdle culled out sixteen cases from the Term 
that presented business-focused facts.87 The whittling down process contin-
ued and, after utilizing input factors #1, #2, and #3, only eleven potential 
business-impact cases remained in the mix. 
                                                 
81 See infra note 107. 
82 See infra Appendix, Table 15. 
83 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580–82 (2012). 
84 Id.at 2580. 
85 Id. at 2578–79. 
86 See supra notes 34–35. 
87 See infra Appendix, Table 15. 
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4. Rubric Input #4: Does a Business-Related Constitutional 
Provision/Amendment and/or Federal Statute Govern? 
There are a select few constitutional provisions and amendments 
aimed towards or interpreted to apply directly to business interests. For 
example, the Commerce Clause sets the boundaries of the federal govern-
ment’s ability to regulate businesses.88 These boundaries have shrunk over 
the years with the federal government allowed to regulate even intrastate 
commerce in certain circumstances.89 The Affordable Care Act consoli-
dated cases tested this limit further concerning whether the federal gov-
ernment may compel people to engage in commerce (purchase insurance 
or pay a fine).90 The Commercial Speech aspect of the First Amendment 
also qualifies under this input. Commercial speech is the primary means 
by which businesses advertise their products and services.91 Finally, many 
federal and state statutes are business-focused and primarily regulate 
commercial transactions or employment relationships. Examples of busi-
ness-focused statutes arising in the 2011–2012 Term are the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.92 State 
statutes may be business-focused as well but are less likely to reach the 
Court other than through a dormant Commerce Clause question. 
Overall, a case surmounts this fourth hurdle when one of these busi-
ness-focused constitutional provisions, amendments, or statutes predomi-
nates via the Question Presented. This occurred in twenty-three cases over 
the Term. Nevertheless, of course, not all twenty-three cases met the other 
three standards. In the end, eleven cases met all four input factors and this 
Article will analyze them in Parts III–VII. 
                                                 
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
89 Id. 
90 See Brad Plumer, Supreme Court Puts New Limits on Commerce Clause. But Will It 
Matter?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (June 28, 2012, 12:58 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/28/the-supreme-court-put-limits-on-commerce-clause
-but-does-it-matter/. 
91 Commercial Speech, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/commercial_speech (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
92 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012) (ana-
lyzing the Fair Labor Standards Act and its outside salesperson exemption in relation to 
pharmaceutical salespeople); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 
1414, 1417 (2012) (analyzing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its statute of 
limitations for suing executives and other insiders for short swing trades). 
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C. The Rubric at Work 
It is useful to showcase this rubric at work by analyzing a randomly 
chosen case from the 2011–2012 Term. Sackett v. EPA involved a dispute 
between the Environmental Protection Agency and private landowners in 
the small Idaho town of Priest Lake (population 750 in the off-season).93 
The Sacketts owned a vacant lot near Priest Lake that they filled with dirt 
in order to construct their dream home.94 The EPA became agitated that 
the Sacketts “discharged pollutants” into what it classified as wetlands ad-
jacent to navigable waters (Priest Lake) without a permit.95 The agency 
issued a compliance order under the Clean Water Act requiring the Sacketts 
to restore the lot to its natural state immediately or face daily $37,500 
fines.96 The Sacketts did not feel that their property was close enough to 
the lake to qualify as wetlands and asked the EPA for a hearing.97 The 
EPA denied this request and the Sacketts then filed a lawsuit in federal 
court, not willing to let the huge fines accumulate any longer.98 The Sacketts 
brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act—a federal law that 
provides for judicial review of “final agency action for which there is no 
other adequate remedy in a court.”99 The Question Presented in the case 
was whether private landowners, alleging a Due Process violation under 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Jousting with the EPA, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jan. 4, 2012, 7:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/argument-preview-jousting
-with-the-epa/ (discussing the case and stating the population of the Idaho town). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 The Clean Water Act bans the release of pollutants in wetlands adjacent to navigable 
waters such as lakes without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1344(a) (2012) (stating the 
“Secretary [of the Environmental Protection Agency] may issue permits, after notice and 
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”). 
97 See, e.g., Denniston, supra note 93 (discussing the case and stating the population 
of the Idaho town). 
98 Id. 
99 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) stating in full: 
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or 
ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the 
final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, 
agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section 
whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for 
a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency 
otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is 
inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority. 
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the Fifth Amendment, may use the Administrative Procedure Act to sue 
the EPA over an administrative compliance order in cases where the EPA 
denies a hearing.100 The government argued that the mere issuing of a 
compliance letter was not final agency action.101 The homeowners claimed 
that, if a court finds that their land was subject to the Clean Water Act, the 
EPA’s compliance letter was final agency action as the fines were pending 
and their hearing request was denied.102 
Table 3 demonstrates why the Sackett case, although interesting and 
tangentially related to business interests, does not make the cut.103 The case 
is based on the classic business law topic of environmental law. In addition, 
business-interest groups filed nine amicus briefs with the Court, all in favor 
of the property owners.104 Up to this point, Sackett clears the first two hur-
dles under the business impact rubric. The case is omitted from the list be-
cause it fails to meet the criteria for the final two impact factors. While the 
case may have repercussions to the business community down the road, its 
facts revolve predominantly around environmental protection and property 
rights issues rather than business. Additionally, under impact factor #4, the 
case is based on the Clean Water Act and the Administrative Procedure 
Act.105 These are both federal statutes that are predominately focused on 
regulating the activities of administrative agencies and protecting the envi-
ronment.106 With only two out of four hurdles cleared, Sackett does not have 
the potential to impact the business arena enough to merit inclusion. Each of 
the sixty-nine argued cases over the 2011–2012 Term are evaluated in this 
manner in the Appendix. 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Denniston, supra note 93 (discussing the Court’s rephrasing of the 
question presented). 
101 Id. 
102 See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371, 1374 (2012). 
103 See infra Table 3. 
104 See Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.sco
tusblog.com/case-files/cases/sackett-et-vir-v-environmental-protection-agency-et-al/ (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
105 See infra Table 3. 
106 See Summary of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs
/laws/cwa.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); Summary of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/apa.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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TABLE 3 
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Administrative 
Procedure Act | 
Clean Water Act 
 
The eleven cases that did make the cut fall into one of four categories: 
(1) intellectual property, (2) employment, (3) consumer protection, and (4) se-
curities regulation.108 Each of these cases received four out of four checks 
via the rubric and represent the best vehicles to evaluate the Term’s impact 
on business. Parts III–VI take each category in order. The case facts are syn-
thesized and followed by a breakdown of each Justice’s vote in the case. 
Part VI debates the merits of the health care cases to determine whether they 
should make the cut. Part VII utilizes this analysis to form a cohesive theory 
Business Impact Theory of the Court’s 2011–2012 Term. 
II. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES 
The Court heard three interesting intellectual property cases over the 
2011–2012 Term.109 Two of the decisions have the potential to significantly 
impact business in the near future.110 One case involved a dispute between a 
                                                 
107 Nine business-related groups filed amicus briefs in this case: (1) the National 
Association of Home Builders et al., (2) the National Institute of Manufacturers, (3) the Wet 
Weather Partnership et al., (4) the American Petroleum Institute et al., (5) the American 
Farm Bureau Federation et al., (6) a combined brief filed for the Center for Constitutional 
Jurisprudence and the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal 
Center, (7) the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, (8) the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, and (9) General Electric Co. Case Pages: October Term 2011, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2011/ (last visited Mar. 23, 
2013); see also Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 104. 
108 See infra Appendix, Table 15. 
109 See supra note 34. 
110 See generally Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012); 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); see also Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012) 
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brand name and a generic manufacturer over two unique methods of treat-
ing diabetes.111 A patent infringement lawsuit ensued. The Court came out 
in favor of the generic manufacturer based on the public policy of rapidly 
getting generic drugs to market and a disfavoring of overbroad patent 
claims.112 The second case was more international in its scope. It involved 
the United States joining the Berne Convention for the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works over a century after Berne’s creation.113 The long 
time gap resulted in the United States copyright regime differing greatly 
from Berne membership requirements.114 Congress granted new copyright 
protection for works in the United States public domain that were protect-
ed internationally.115 Outrage ensued as people were forced to pay for li-
censes to conduct symphonies, reproduce music, and market movies that 
were previously royalty-free.116 The Court held that Congress may choose 
to remove works from the public domain without violating the Copyright 
Clause or the First Amendment to satisfy Berne’s membership obliga-
tions.117 This Section analyzes both cases in turn. 
A. The Court Favored a Generic Manufacturer and Quickly Moving 
Generics to Market 
Caraco v. Novo Nordisk investigated the world of medicine patents.118 In-
tense competition exists between brand name drug manufacturers and their 
generic competitors. Many species of patents exist to protect brand manufac-
turers’ abundant marketing and research and development expenditures.119 At 
                                                                                                                         
(holding unanimously that “there are no limitations on a patent applicant’s ability to 
introduce new evidence in a [judicial proceeding to reconsider a denied patent application 
by the Patent and Trademark Office] beyond those already present in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); Mayo Collaborate Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (holding unanimously that “the 
patent claims at issue here effectively claim the underlying laws of nature themselves” 
and are thereby non-patentable). The Mayo and Kappos cases are not discussed in this 
section because they are pure intellectual property and evidence law cases likely to have 
little impact on business as compared to Caraco and Golan. 
111 See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1675. 
112 Id. at 1688. 




117 Id. at 894. 
118 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675 (2012). 
119 See, e.g., Vinod Singh, How to Read & Understand Drug Patents, EZINEARTICLES 
(Oct. 20, 2007), http://ezinearticles.com/?How-to-Read-and-Understand-Drug-Patents&id 
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the same time, Congress mandates that the Food and Drug Administration 
quickly approve generic drugs that do not infringe on brand patents.120 Cara-
co involved compound patents (protecting specific mixtures of chemicals 
comprising a drug) and method patents (granting manufacturers exclusive 
rights to use a drug in particular ways).121 Because drug treatment options 
constantly evolve, brand manufacturers often obtain and hold method patents 
after their compound patents expire.122 Loss of patent protection allows ge-
neric manufacturers to copy a specific chemical combination and produce the 
same drugs at a much lower cost.123 Generics may only be used, however, in 
ways that do not violate a brand’s existing method patents.124 To determine a 
generic drug’s eligibility, the FDA requires brand manufacturers to submit 
“use codes” describing the scope of their patented methods.125 The FDA as-
sumes submitted use codes are accurate and analyzes applications for generic 
drugs according to them.126 
                                                                                                                         
=792091 (listing eight different types of medical patents: (1) “composition,” (2) “formulation,” 
(3) “compound,” (4) “dosage,” (5) “method,” (6) “use,” (7) “drug delivery,” and (8) “devices”); 
see also Timothy Noah, The Make-Believe Billion: How Drug Companies Exaggerate 
Research Costs to Justify Absurd Profits, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2011, 9:19 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/business/the_customer/2011/03/the_makebelieve_billion.html 
(arguing that pharmaceutical companies do not spend as much on marketing and R & D as 
they claim and that “[t]he statistic Big Pharma typically cites ... is that the cost of bringing a 
new drug to market is about $1 billion. Now a new study indicates the cost is more like, um, 
$55 million.”). 
120 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–86 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 
21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). This Act is also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act for its original 
sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch (Republican of Utah) and Representative Henry Waxman 
(Democrat of California); see, e.g., Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
121 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See id. at 1676–77. 
125 Id. at 1676 (“To facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow, 
[federal statutes] and FDA regulations direct brand manufacturers to file information 
about their patents. The statute mandates that a brand submit in its [new drug application] 
‘the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which 
the [brand] submitted the [NDA] or which claims a method of using such drug.’”). Once 
the new drug application is approved, “the brand [must] provide a description of any 
method-of-use patent it holds” or a use code. Id. 
126 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (“The FDA takes that code as a given: It does not 
independently assess the patent’s scope or otherwise look behind the description authored 
by the brand. According to the agency, it lacks ‘both [the] expertise and [the] authority’ 
to review patent claims; although it will forward questions about the accuracy of a use 
code to the brand, its own ‘role with respect to patent listing is ministerial.’”). 
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The diabetes drug repaglinide is manufactured and sold by Caraco Phar-
maceutical Laboratories (in a generic version) and Novo Nordisk (the brand 
name version called Prandin).127 The FDA approved Prandin to treat diabetes 
in three unique ways,128 but Novo only held a patent for one of those meth-
ods.129 Caraco desired to gain market share via its generic version for the two 
non-patented methods and filed an abbreviated new drug application.130 Lat-
er, Novo filed an updated use code incorrectly claiming patents for all three 
uses.131 Caraco understood the use code was inaccurate and continued to seek 
approval.132 Novo sued for patent infringement.133 Caraco counterclaimed 
that Novo’s new use code was overbroad.134 Novo contended that use codes 
could not be challenged via counterclaim as long as the use code description 
correctly stated at least one accurate patented use.135 
The Court unanimously concluded that a generic manufacturer may file 
a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit to correct a brand’s overbroad 
use code.136 The Justices argued that counterclaims in patent infringement 
lawsuits allow the issue to be resolved more quickly and speed up approvals 
of generic drugs to market.137 The argument continued that allowing these 
claims honors Congress’s desire, is better public policy, and incentivizes 
brand names to file accurate use codes.138 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
joined the ruling but went further and scolded the FDA and Congress for 
                                                 
127 Id. at 1678. 
128 The FDA “has approved three uses of Prandin to treat diabetes: repaglinide by 
itself; repaglinide in combination with metformin; and repaglinide in combination with 
thiazolidinediones (TZDs).” Id. 
129 Id. at 1678–79 (“Novo currently holds a patent for one of the three FDA-approved 
uses of repaglinide—its use with metformin. But Novo holds no patent for the use of 
repaglinide with TZDs or its use alone.”). 
130 Id. at 1679. 
131 Id. 
132 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1678. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1680–81 (“[A generic manufacturer] sued for patent infringement may bring 
a counterclaim ‘on the ground that the patent does not claim ... an approved method of 
using the drug.’ The parties debate the meaning of this language. Novo (like the Federal 
Circuit) reads ‘not an’ to mean ‘not any,’ contending that ‘the counterclaim is available 
only if the listed patent does not claim any (or, equivalently, claims no) approved method 
of using the drug.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
136 Id. at 1688. 
137 Id. at 1681–82 (“The Hatch-Waxman Amendments authorize the FDA to approve 
the marketing of a generic drug for particular unpatented uses[, and a counterclaim in a 
patent infringement lawsuit] provides the mechanism for a generic company to identify 
those uses, so that a product with a label matching them can quickly come to market.”). 
138 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1682–85. 
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making the rules in this area too opaque for brand name manufacturers to 
interpret clearly.139 
TABLE 4 
CARACO V. NOVO NORDISK VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Caraco v. Novo Nordisk | (9-0) 
Justice Vote 




Majority and concurrence (author): law is too opaque in this area 
for brand name manufacturers to get clarity on disclosure re-
quirements 
Kagan Majority (author): generic drug makers may sue for overbroad use codes to further public policy of hurrying generics to market 







B. The Court Upheld Congressional Copyright Grants to Works in the 
Public Domain 
The second significant intellectual property case, Golan v. Holder, re-
viewed a Congressional grant of copyright protection to foreign works pro-
tected internationally yet residing in the United States public domain.140 
                                                 
139 Id. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Precisely because the regulatory scheme 
depends on the accuracy and precision of use codes, I find FDA’s guidance as to what is 
required of brand manufacturers in use codes remarkably opaque.”). 
140 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012). The federal law at issue is the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 
4976 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A) [hereinafter URAA] (discussing the specific 
requirements for works to be restored under Berne and at issue in Golan v. Holder). More 
specifically, the statute proclaims that “[c]opyright subsists .... in restored works, and 
vests automatically on the date of restoration” and “[a]ny work in which copyright is 
restored under this section shall subsist for the remainder of the term of copyright that the 
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These “orphan works”141 were being used, royalty-free, by American con-
ductors, producers, and educators among others for concerts, movies, and 
other commercial uses.142 This legal double standard angered foreign gov-
ernments who protected American copyrighted works used in their com-
mercial sphere.143 The problem arose from unfortunate timing. The primary 
international accord governing international copyright relations—the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works144—took ef-
fect in 1886. The United States joined Berne over a century later in 1989.145 
Berne requires reciprocal copyright relationships between member coun-
tries; these membership requirements146 persuaded the federal government 
                                                                                                                         
work would have otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entored 
[sic] the public domain in the United States.” URAA § 514(a)(1). 
141 Works found themselves orphaned in the United States for three primary reasons: 
(1) the United States did not protect works from the origin country at the time of their 
publication, (2) the United States did not protect sound recordings fixed before 1972, or 
(3) the foreign author failed to comply with United States statutory formalities [no longer 
applicable under copyright law] for copyright protection. See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 
878. With no United States copyright protection, these orphaned works found their way 
into the public domain. Id. 
142 See, e.g., Joan McGivern & Christine Pepe, Golan v. Holder: The Long Road to 
Restoration, ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010, 10:46 PM), http://nysbar.com
/blogs/EASL/2010/12/golan_v_holder_the_long_road_t.html (stating that these royalty-free 
users claimed that “Section 514 [of the URAA] not only harmed their free speech, but also 
their economic interests, having spent time and money restoring or preparing the works on the 
expectation that the works would remain in the public domain”). 
143 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880 (examining reports of international retribution for 
United States copyright policy relating to orphaned works and stating that “[t]he minimalist 
approach essayed by the United States did not sit well with other Berne members”). 
144 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and 
amended in 1979). 
145 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877; Copyright, International Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY, 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/The+United+States+and+the+Berne+Convention 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“In 1989, the United States for the first time became a signatory 
to the oldest and most widely approved international copyright treaty, the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.... In doing so, the United States ended a long 
history of noncompliance with the Berne Convention, finally joining the vast majority of 
developed countries.”). 
146 Once the United Sates joined Berne, it became responsible to comply with the 
Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which included the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPs]. TRIPs 
requires its signatories to comply with Article 18, among others, of the Berne Convention. 
TRIPS art. 9.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1201, available at http://www.wto.org
/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04_e.htm (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 
21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.”). This compliance provision 
 
418 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:385 
to grant copyright protection to orphan works thus avoiding potential tariffs, 
retaliation, and sanctions by the World Trade Organization.147 United States 
copyright holders also gained protection in foreign countries withholding it 
before their orphan works became protected.148 In the end, this restoration 
process removed works from the public domain and prior users were forced 
to obtain licenses.149 Lawsuits were filed alleging First Amendment and 
Copyright Clause violations.150 
The Court upheld the copyright restoration law under both alleged con-
stitutional deficiencies.151 The majority claimed the law does not violate the 
Copyright Clause because Congress has historically been able to remove 
works from the public domain152 and new license fees do not hinder the 
“Progress of Science” as prohibited by the Constitution.153 Additionally, the 
law did not offend the First Amendment because these users may still use 
the work under the Fair Use doctrine and copyright holders are still not al-
lowed to copyright ideas.154 In the end, the majority proclaimed: “Congress 
determined that U.S. interests were best served by our full participation in 
the dominant system of international copyright protection. Those interests 
include ensuring exemplary compliance with our international obligations, 
securing greater protection for U.S. authors abroad, and remedying unequal 
treatment of foreign authors.”155 
Justice Breyer’s dissent objected to damming the free flow of important 
information lubricated by the public domain.156 The idea is that Congress 
                                                                                                                         
motivated the United States to extend copyright protection to all works of foreign origin 
whose term of protection had not expired. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881. 
147 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881. 
148 See id. at 884. 
149 See id. at 883. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 894 (“[The copyright restoration legislation] lies well within the ken of the 
political branches. It is our obligation, of course, to determine whether the action 
Congress took, wise or not, encounters any constitutional shoal. For the reasons stated, 
we are satisfied it does not.”). 
152 See id. at 887 (stating that “Congress has also passed generally applicable legislation 
granting patents and copyrights to inventions and works that had lost protection” and 
cataloging Congressional acts to restore copyright to works in the public domain). 
153 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“The provision of incentives for the creation of new works 
is surely an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and learning. We hold .... 
that it is not the sole means Congress may use ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science.’”). 
154 See id. at 891 (“And nothing in the historical record, congressional practice, or our 
own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment solicitude for copyrighted 
works that were once in the public domain.”). 
155 Id. at 894. 
156 Id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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should have taken less restrictive alternatives to satisfy Berne membership 
requirements instead of pulling works from the public domain.157 The dissent 
stated that the “Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light of the First Amend-
ment, does not authorize Congress to enact this statute.”158 
TABLE 5 
GOLAN V. HOLDER VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Golan v. Holder | (6-2) 
Justice Vote 
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote: 2-1 for majority 
Ginsburg 
Majority (author): no Copyright Clause/First Amendment violation 
when works in public domain granted copyrights to satisfy interna-
tional obligations 
Breyer Dissent (author): less-restrictive ways to satisfy membership in Berne than stifling speech by removing works from public domain 
Sotomayor Majority 
Kagan Recused 






III. THE EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES 
Seven interesting employment law cases made the Court’s 2011–2012 
docket,159 three of which merit deeper analysis based on their potential impact 
                                                 
157 Id. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
159 See generally Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) 
(involving a state employer who (a) conditions employment on the payment of a special union 
assessment intended solely for political and ideological expenditures without first providing a 
notice and/or opportunity to object, and (b) conditions employment on the payment of union 
fees to finance ballot measures); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 
(2012) (examining the deference owed to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act outside salesperson exemption and whether the exemption applies to 
pharmaceutical salespeople); Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (holding by a 
5-4 conservative-leaning majority that lawsuits against states under the self-care provision of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act [allowing employees time off to tend to their own serious 
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on business.160 Hosanna-Tabor Church v. EEOC looked at the interaction of 
the First Amendment and employment discrimination law.161 What happens 
when an ordained minister (teaching both secular and religious subjects at a 
religious school) becomes disabled, recovers with a desire to return to work, 
and finds that the administration hired a replacement and now wishes to termi-
nate employment?162 The Court held that the ministerial exception, located in 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment, prohibits courts from second-
guessing a religious organization’s employment actions against its ministers.163 
In the end, a unanimous majority expanded the First Amendment to protect the 
employment interests of a commercial, albeit religious in nature, entity.164 
The second case, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., dealt with 
whether the outside salesperson exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act 
exempts pharmaceutical sales representatives from overtime pay.165 The 
sticky part of the case revolved around the idea that these representatives 
were not allowed to actually sell drugs to the doctors they called on as they 
worked over forty hours per week.166 The Court held that the exemption 
                                                                                                                         
health condition when the condition interferes with the employee’s ability to perform at work] 
are barred by sovereign immunity); Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012) 
(holding via an 8-1 majority that employees are “newly awarded compensation” as required 
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act when they first become 
disabled regardless of when an authority issues compensation orders on their behalf); 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) 
(evaluating the tension between the Ministerial Exception to the First Amendment and 
employment discrimination statutes); Elgin v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 453 (2011) 
(showing grant of the certiorari petition on a case involving the Civil Service Reform Act and 
an employee wishing to bypass the usual Merits Systems Protection Board hearing and, 
instead, have a wrongful termination claim heard by a district court); Pacific Operators 
Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/pac
ific-operations-offshore-llp-v-valladolid/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (citing Pac. Operators 
Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680 (2012)) (“The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
extends coverage for injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer 
continental shelf to an employee who can establish a substantial nexus between his injury and 
his employer’s extractive operations on the shelf.”). 
160 Four cases do not touch on the business realm closely enough to merit 
consideration in this Section. Coleman, Roberts, Pacific, and Elgin are cases that either 
deal with obscure federal statutes (that is, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(Pacific), the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (Roberts), and the Civil 
Service Reform Act (Elgin), or constitutional issues somewhat distant from business such 
as sovereign immunity (Coleman)). 
161 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699. 
162 See id. at 699–700. 
163 Id. at 710. 
164 Id. at 698. 
165 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012). 
166 Id. at 2165. 
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was properly applied to this class of employees because they were the type 
of workers to whom this exemption was meant to apply.167 
The third case, Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 
1000, dealt with a public sector employer in California and the union repre-
senting all of its employees.168 The union made a mid-year assessment of all 
members without giving them notice or the chance to object.169 The assess-
ment was intended to cover only expenses related to a political campaign 
against anti-labor ballot propositions in California.170 Nonmember, dues-
paying employees sued the union alleging that the assessment was unconsti-
tutional.171 The Court agreed and created an opt-in scheme by which non-
members are now allowed to choose whether to pay such assessments.172 
A. The Court Allows Religious Employees to Control the Hiring and 
Firing of Minister-Employees 
Hosanna-Tabor Church v. EEOC examined the synergy between em-
ployment law and the First Amendment’s religion clauses.173 Cheryl Perich, a 
commissioned minister, taught secular and religious classes, led her students 
in prayer and took her students to weekly chapel at Hosanna Tabor School.174 
During her employment, she developed narcolepsy and took disability 
leave.175 Eight months later, she aspired to return to teaching but the school 
had filled her position and asked her to resign.176 She presented herself at the 
school, refused to resign and threatened to sue under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act.177 Hosanna-Tabor terminated her based on “insubordination and 
                                                 
167 Id. at 2172–73. 
168 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012). 
169 Id. at 2285–86. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 2286. 
172 Id. at 2298. 
173 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
699 (2012) (“The question presented [by Chief Justice Roberts] is whether the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar [the termination of 
a teacher leading secular and religious classes] when the employer is a religious group 
and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.”). 
174 Id. at 700 (“Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a year.”). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 700–01 (“[The principal] also expressed concern that Perich was not yet 
ready to return to the classroom.... Hosanna-Tabor held a meeting of its congregation at 
which school administrators stated that Perich was unlikely to be physically capable of 
returning to work that school year or the next. The congregation voted to offer Perich a 
“peaceful release” from her call, whereby the congregation would pay a portion of her 
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disruptive behavior” as well as damaging her working relationship with the 
administration by threatening to take legal action.178 The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission sued on her behalf alleging retaliation for threat-
ening an ADA claim.179 The school argued that the suit was barred under 
the First Amendment and its ministerial exception.180 This exception has 
been held to preclude “application of employment discrimination legisla-
tion to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious 
institution and its ministers.”181 Perich claimed she was a lay employee 
performing secular functions in a commercial context and “the govern-
ment has a strong interest in assuring that she and others in her position 
can do so free of invidious discrimination.”182 
The Court held that the ministerial exception, legally enforceable in 
eleven federal circuits, is constitutional under the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses of the First Amendment.183 Chief Justice Roberts, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court stated: 
                                                                                                                         
health insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher. Perich 
refused to resign and produced a note from her doctor stating that she would be able to 
return to work on February 22. The school board urged Perich to reconsider, informing 
her that the school no longer had a position for her, but Perich stood by her decision not 
to resign. On ... the first day she was medically cleared to return to work—Perich 
presented herself at the school. [The principal] asked her to leave but she would not do so 
until she obtained written documentation that she had reported to work. Later that 
afternoon, [the principal] called Perich at home and told her that she would likely be 
fired. Perich responded that she had spoken with an attorney and intended to assert her 
legal rights.” (internal citations omitted)). “The ADA prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” Id. at 701 (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990)). The law “also prohibits an employer from retaliating 
‘against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made 
unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].’” 
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1990)). 
178 Id. at 700. 
179 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701 (“The EEOC brought suit against Hosanna-
Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA 
lawsuit. Perich intervened in the litigation ....”). 
180 Id. (“Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment [under the ministerial 
exception] .... According to the Church, Perich was a minister, and she had been fired for 
a religious reason—namely, that her threat to sue the Church violated the Synod’s belief 
that Christians should resolve their disputes internally.”). 
181 Id. at 705 (collecting federal appellate cases making that same point). 
182 Brief for Respondent at 61, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 
WL 3380507, at *61. 
183 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
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We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a 
religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a 
church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for 
failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. 
Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving 
the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its 
beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free 
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own 
faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power 
to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the 
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such 
ecclesiastical decisions.184 
The opinion concluded by holding that the ministerial exception applies 
to Perich as a minister.185 Even though Perich claimed to be a lay teacher, 
the Court found that because of “the formal title given Perich by the 
Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the 
important religious functions she performed for the Church[,] .... Perich was 
a minister covered by the ministerial exception.”186 This case is important as 
it represents the first time the Court evaluated how the “freedom of a reli-
gious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging dis-
crimination in employment.”187 
                                                 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 710. The Court also limited the holding to the idea that the ministerial 
exception bars an employment discrimination lawsuit against a church employer and a 
minster employee. Id. (“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of 
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by 
their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the 
exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”). 
186 Id. at 708. 
187 Id. at 705. This is true even though the “Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have had 
extensive experience with this issue.” Id. 
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TABLE 6 
HOSANNA-TABOR V. EEOC VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC | (9-0) 
Justice Vote 




Kagan Majority | Concurrence (joined Alito) 
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 for majority 
Scalia Majority 
Kennedy Majority 
Thomas Majority | Concurrence (author): look at whether religious organi-zation “sincerely believes” employee to be a minister 
Roberts Majority (author): ministerial exception constitutional. Perich falls under its reach; Church legally terminated her 
Alito 
Majority | Concurrence (author): the term “minster” is misleading. 
Court should focus on function performed employees at religious 
bodies 
 
B. The Court Evaluates Exceptions to the FLSA’s Overtime Rule 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. evaluated the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) and its overtime requirements and exemptions.188 
The FLSA requires overtime pay of at least 1.5 times the employee’s regu-
lar rate for hours worked over forty per workweek.189 However, the law ex-
empts employers from paying certain categories of workers such overtime 
                                                 
188 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012). See 
generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006) (stating laws 
for maximum hours). 
189 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer 
shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in 
the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty 
hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the 
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at 
which he is employed.”). 
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pay.190 One such exempted category is the outside salesperson.191 The exact 
range of what types of jobs fall within this exemption has been up for de-
bate; this is especially true when it comes to pharmaceutical sales represent-
atives (PSRs).192 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK or Glaxo) is an international 
pharmaceutical company.193 GSK employs PSRs to pitch its drugs to doc-
tors in hopes of having them prescribed to patients.194 Even though its PSRs 
cannot make sales to doctors or patients in the traditional sense of the word, 
GSK believes that its PSRs are exempt from overtime under the outside 
salesperson exemption.195 Two former GSK representatives alleged they 
were thereby required to work ten to twenty hours of overtime per week 
without compensation.196 The sales representatives filed an action against 
the company seeking back overtime pay and liquidated damages.197 GSK 
responded to the charges that both men are properly classified “outside 
salesmen” and properly exempted from overtime.198 
The major issue in the case revolved around whether pharmaceutical 
salespeople actually make sales and thus qualify for the exemption.199 Since 
                                                 
190 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006). 
191 Id. 
192 See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164–65; Overtime Exemption for Outside Sales Reps: 
A New Wrinkle, HRWEBADVISOR (May 14, 2012), http://www.hrwebadvisor.com/head 
lines/article/overtime-exemption-outside-sales-reps-new-wrinkle (“Questions regarding the 
entitlement to overtime pay are especially murky with regard to [pharmaceutical sales 
representatives (PSRs)] who ... do not actually ‘sell’ pharmaceutical drugs to physicians but 
simply promote them. Only when a doctor, heeding a PSR’s pitch, later prescribes the drugs 
for his or her patients are sales actually made. As a result, plaintiffs [in FLSA overtime 
cases] argue that PSRs should be entitled to overtime pay because they do not fall under the 
outside salesman exemption.”). 
193 See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2163 (“SmithKline Beecham Corporation is in the 
business of developing, manufacturing, and selling prescription drugs.”); About Us, 
GLASKOSMITHKLINE, http://www.gsk.com/about-us.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2013). 
SmithKline Beechman was doing business as GlaxoSmithKline. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2156. 
194 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2163–64. 
195 Id. at 2164. 
196 Id. (“Outside of normal business hours, petitioners [(the two former pharmaceut-
ical salespeople)] spent an additional 10 to 20 hours each week [above the 40 hours per 
week they called on doctors offices] attending events, reviewing product information, 
returning phone calls, responding to e-mails, and performing other miscellaneous tasks. 
Petitioners were not required to punch a clock or report their hours, and they were subject 
to only minimal supervision.”); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 
385 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the petitioners’ terminations and stating that one em-
ployee was terminated from the company and the other accepted a similar position at 
another pharmaceutical company). 
197 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164. 
198 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 388. 
199 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2161. 
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they are not legally allowed to sell drugs to patients, they must (1) sell their 
product to pharmacies and (2) market specific drugs to physicians in hopes 
of future patient prescriptions.200 They claim to have spent their time out-
side of corporate offices but within a specified geographic area.201 When not 
making physician calls, sales representatives “study Glaxo products and rel-
evant disease states. They will prepare new presentation modules, respond to 
phone calls and e-mails, generate reports, and attend evening and weekend 
seminars. These tasks are typically performed outside of customary business 
hours.”202 Part of their pay is salary and part incentive based.203 Incentive-
based compensation “is paid if Glaxo’s market share for a particular product 
increases in a PSR’s territory, sales volume for a product increases, sales 
revenue increases, or the dose volume increases. Glaxo aims to have a 
PSR’s total compensation be approximately 75% salary and 25% incentive 
compensation.”204 These duties are similar across the industry. 
The district court granted SmithKline’s summary judgment motion and 
held that these salespeople “unmistakably fit within the terms and spirit of 
the exemption.”205 The Ninth Circuit affirmed under the theory that: 
[Pharmaceutical salespeople] are driven by their own ambition and 
rewarded with commissions when their efforts generate new sales. They 
receive their commissions in lieu of overtime and enjoy a largely 
autonomous work-life outside of an office. The pharmaceutical industry’s 
representatives—detail men and women—share many more similarities 
than differences with their colleagues in other sales fields, and we hold 
that they are exempt from the FLSA overtime-pay requirement.206 
                                                 
200 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 385 (“Because Glaxo is proscribed from selling Rx-only 
products directly to the public, it sells its prescription pharmaceuticals to distributors or 
retail pharmacies, which then dispense those products to the ultimate user, as authorized 
by a licensed physician’s prescription.”). These requirements are found in the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970; see 21 U.S.C. § 829(b)–(d) (2006). 
201 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 386. 
202 Sam Wieczorek, Argument Preview: The “Outside Salesman” Exception to the 
FLSA’s Overtime-Pay Requirement, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:44 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/?p=142535. 
203 Christopher, 635 F.3d at 387. 
204 Id. 
205 Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., 2009 WL 4051075, at *5 (D. Ariz. 
Nov. 20, 2009) (stating that the district court observed that pharmaceutical sales 
representatives “are not hourly workers, but instead earn salaries well above minimum 
wage—up to $100,000 a year,” and that they receive bonuses in lieu of overtime as “an 
incentive to increase their efforts”). 
206 See Christopher, 623 F.3d at 400–01. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed as well, and held in favor of GSK.207 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Alito held that the intent of the FLSA overtime 
exemptions was honored in this case.208 These PSRs made a great deal of 
money while the FLSA exemptions were meant to protect employers earn-
ing lower salaries and benefits.209 In this vein, the majority opinion held: 
Petitioners—each of whom earned an average of more than $70,000 per 
year and spent between 10 and 20 hours outside normal business hours 
each week performing work related to his assigned portfolio of drugs in 
his assigned sales territory—are hardly the kind of employees that the 
FLSA was intended to protect.210 
Additionally, the majority did not believe the PSRs’ arguments that 
they merely stimulated sales and sold nothing more than a “concept” of 
the drug’s treatment potential.211 The Court also brushed aside the De-
partment of Labor’s rather recent position that PSRs should not be exempt 
and did not grant the Department the traditional deference granted to ad-
ministrative agencies.212 
Justice Breyer’s dissent—joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and 
Kagan—would have held that these PSRs are non-exempt.213 The dissent an-
alyzed the FLSA, Department of Labor regulations, ethical codes (particular-
ly the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Code on In-
teractions with Health Care Professionals), and Labor Department Reports to 
come to its conclusion.214 In the end, to the dissenters, a PSR “does not take 
orders, he does not consummate a sale, and he does not direct his efforts to-
wards the consummation of any eventual sale (by the pharmacist).”215 There-
fore, he is not an outside salesperson and must be paid overtime.216 
                                                 
207 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2165 (2012). 
208 See id. at 2173. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 2162. 
211 See id. at 2173–74. 
212 Id. at 2170 (“We find the DOL’s interpretation of its regulations quite unpersuasive. 
The interpretation to which we are now asked to defer—that a sale demands a transfer of 
title—plainly lacks the hallmarks of thorough consideration. Because the DOL first 
announced its view that pharmaceutical sales representatives do not qualify as outside 
salesmen in a series of amicus briefs, there was no opportunity for public comment, and the 
interpretation that initially emerged from the Department’s internal decision making 
process proved to be untenable.”). 
213 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
214 Id. at 2178–79. 
215 Id. at 2178–80. 
216 Id. at 2179. 
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Interestingly, the oral arguments did not help predict the controversial 5-4 
opinion in this case. For example, Justice Ginsburg appeared to favor GSK’s 
position in oral argument by noting that these representatives expect time 
and one half in overtime pay even though they often play golf and otherwise 
entertain doctors.217 She asked the following set of questions: “[W]hat about 
the extras? I mean, we’re told that part of this job is to have a good relation-
ship with the doctors. It includes dinners. It may be conventions. Entertain-
ment, maybe golf. If—if you’re right, would the time on the golf course get 
time and a half?”218 The audience in the courtroom laughed.219 In the end, 
she was apparently not persuaded by her own question and dissented from the 
ruling.220 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, tipped his hand in oral argu-
ment and stuck to his initial stance; the Justice with the critical swing vote in 
close cases like this one indicated that he wanted to vote for Glaxo when he 
asked the attorney for the company: 
What’s the case that I cite if this opinion is written the way you—you 
propose, and the—this Court says, well, this has been 70 years [that these 
types of salespeople have been exempt from overtime] ... and the 
Department [of Labor] has never made an objection. And, therefore, it 
follows that the Department’s interpretation is implausible or improper, 
and then I cite some case from our Court. What—how do I write this?221 
When the attorney tried to dodge the question and state that he did not want to 
provide such a case, Justice Kennedy responded, “Well, I’d like one.”222 
Another issue raised by the Justices was that a ruling for the plaintiffs 
would mean that pharmaceutical companies would be on the hook for mil-
lions of dollars of overtime pay to tens of thousands of pharmaceutical sales-
people.223 Based on oral arguments it appeared unlikely that the Court would 
allow this retroactive punishment to occur.224 A few Justices made the point 
that the Department of Labor, if it wants to change the scope of this exception 
so drastically, should provide the change with a notice and comment peri-
od.225 Justice Breyer took this position and seemed to side with the conserva-
tive-leaning Justices by adding: 
                                                 
217 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Christopher, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 11-
204) [hereinafter Christopher Oral Arguments]. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 10. 
220 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 2174. 
221 Christopher Oral Arguments, supra note 217, at 49. 
222 Id. at 50. 
223 Id. at 27. 
224 Id. at 27–28. 
225 Id. at 22–24. 
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That’s where I’m sort of bothered, just exactly what Justice Scalia said, 
that if you look through what I’ve seen so far by the materials, they’re 
pretty evenly balanced, and there are tens of thousands of people who 
work in this industry, and there’s a history of 75 years of nobody said 
anything. So you would think—and it isn’t the only problem that has just 
been recognized in other industries, too. If the agency is going to reverse, 
not reverse, but suddenly do something it hasn’t done for 75 years, the 
right way to do it is to have notice and comment, hearings, allow people 
to present their point of view, and then make some rules or determine 
what should happen. Perhaps they’d say for the future let’s do this, but 
not let’s give people a windfall for the past.226 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were the only two Justices at oral argu-
ment who appeared likely to reverse the Ninth Circuit opinion.227 In oral 
arguments they both grilled the lawyer for GSK on the Court’s historical 
preference of giving deference to the Department of Labor’s (relatively 
new) interpretation that these workers should qualify for overtime.228 In the 
end, the business won the day, the outside salesperson exemption was not 
narrowed, and the PSRs were not entitled to the back overtime and liquidat-
ed damages they sought.229 
                                                 
226 Id. at 22–23. 
227 Id. at 45–47. 
228 Id. (quoting Justice Sotomayor questioning the attorney for Glaxo and stating: 
“Tell me ... why your rule has to win. Meaning, aren’t we supposed to give deference to 
the expertise of the agency, especially when Congress lets them define.”). 
229 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012). 
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TABLE 7 
CHRISTOPHER V. SMITHKLINE VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Christopher v. SmithKline | (5-4) 
Justice Vote 
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 in dissent 
Ginsburg Dissent 
Breyer 
Dissent (author): A PSR’s primary duty is not to take orders and 
make sales without giving the term a special meaning and, there-
fore, a PSR cannot be an outside salesperson under the FLSA 
Sotomayor Dissent 
Kagan Dissent 






Majority (author): PSRs are properly classified as exempt from 
overtime pay because they properly made “sales” for purposes of 
the FLSA 
 
C. The Court Analyzes an Employee’s Right Not to Speak 
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 dealt with a 
compelled, mid-year assessment of union dues collected solely for political 
purposes.230 The Service Employees International Union is the officially rec-
ognized bargaining unit for California state employees.231 State employees 
are required to: (1) become SEIU members or, (2) at a minimum, have union 
fees deducted from their paychecks each year of their employment.232 The 
                                                 
230 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012). 
231 Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011). 
232 The court stated more specifically: 
The Union and the State of California have entered into a series of 
Memoranda of Understanding controlling the terms and conditions of 
employment for employees, including a provision requiring that all State 
employees in these bargaining units join the Union as formal Union 
members, or if opting not to join, pay an “agency” or “fair share” fee to 
the Union for its representational efforts on their behalf (known as an 
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justification for such compelled payments is that unions spend time and 
money collectively bargaining on behalf of all of an organization’s employ-
ees.233 Allowing nonmembers to receive these work-related benefits without 
paying for them would lead to free riding.234 
Each year, SEIU officials would analyze audited expenditures from the 
prior year to determine the current year’s dues.235 Any discrepancy between 
what was charged at the beginning of the year and what the union actually 
spent would be charged or deducted in the next year’s assessment.236 Union 
officials must disclose the amount of and reasons behind the assessment to 
all members and nonmembers in a so-called Hudson notice.237 This notice 
requirement comes from a United States Supreme Court case styled Chica-
go Teachers Union v. Hudson, where the Supreme Court held “the constitu-
tional requirements for the Union’s collection of agency fees include an ad-
equate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity 
to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker, and 
an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are 
pending.”238 In the notice, the union explains that some of these expenses 
are chargeable to nonmembers (such as expenditures related to union’s posi-
tion as official bargaining representative) and others are not (such as politi-
cal and other ideological expenditures).239 The union may charge nonmem-
bers up front for all expenditures unless a nonmember objects.240 Upon 
objection, the union must reduce the charge to the proper portion of charge-
able expenditures used for collective bargaining purposes.241 
For 2005, the union declared that 99.1% of all expenditures for the up-
coming year would be proportionally deducted from employees’ paychecks 
in relatively small amounts based on their wages.242 Nonmembers who ob-
jected would have the percentage reduced to 56.35%.243 Later that year, how-
ever, the political scene changed in California. There were several proposals 
                                                                                                                         
“agency shop agreement”). The agency fee is calculated as a percentage 
of the Union dues paid by members of the Union. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
233 Id. at 1127 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1118 (majority opinion). 
236 Id. 
237 Knox, 628 F.3d at 1118. 
238 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986). 
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in the upcoming election that caught the attention of organized labor.244 The 
SEIU proposed an “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political 
Fight-Back Fund,” applicable to all covered employees, to fight against any 
measures union officials deemed against the interests of state employees.245 
No new Hudson notice was sent out along with the mid-year assessment de-
mand.246 The union made clear that the assessment was due from members 
and nonmembers alike.247 Eight state employees sued and argued that SEIU’s 
initial Hudson notice from earlier in the year did not provide warning con-
cerning the mid-year assessment.248 
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 
ordering the union 
to issue, within sixty (60) days following the date of this Order, a proper 
Hudson notice as to the 2005 Assessment, offering nonmembers a forty-
five (45) day period in which to object. The Union shall thereafter issue 
to those nonmembers who object to this new Hudson notice a refund of 
the nonchargeable portion of the Assessment.249 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and found that a second Hudson notice was not 
necessary “when adopting a temporary, mid-term fee increase.”250 
The Supreme Court could have held that the case was moot and avoid-
ed deciding it on the merits. In fact, the issue of mootness arose prior to 
oral arguments.251 New SIEU leadership changed its policy to provide a 
fresh Hudson notice for mid-year assessments and, in 2011, sent “a one-
dollar bill to all members of the petitioners’ class, along with a promise to 
refund one hundred percent of the fee increase they paid.”252 The union al-
leged that this satisfied the remedy fashioned by the district court below and 
                                                 
244 Id. 
245 Knox, 628 F.3d at 1118–19 (stating that the assessment notice claimed that that the 
fund “will not be used for regular costs of the union—such as office rent, staff salaries or 
routine equipment replacement”). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 1124 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
249 Knox v. Westly, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25579, at *33–34 (2008) (emphasis added). 
250 See Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1117. 
251 Ross Runkel, Argument Recap: Mootness Could Squelch Union Fees Case, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/argument-recap-mo
otness-could-squelch-union-fees-case/. 
252 Id. (stating prior to the opinion in the case that there “is a strong argument that this 
case is moot. It could be moot under Article III standards, or instead as a matter of 
judicial prudence. If so, the Court’s normal course is to vacate the judgment of the lower 
court .... Then the issue would be whether the Court would leave the district court 
judgment in place or declare it moot as well.”). 
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mooted the case.253 The Supreme Court disagreed as the majority found that 
the union made it difficult for nonmembers to apply for refunds of collected 
mid-year assessments and that a “live controversy” still existed.254 
With the mootness argument dismissed, the Court ruled 7-2 that the un-
ion violated the First Amendment speech rights of the nonmembers by fail-
ing to send out a fresh Hudson notice.255 This is where the seven-Justice 
majority fell apart. The conservative-leaning Justices formed a second ma-
jority and took the analysis one step further.256 They held that any time a 
union imposes a special assessment it must: (1) send out a fresh Hudson no-
tice and (2) allow nonmembers to decide whether to pay the assessment (the 
so-called opt-in requirement).257 In Justice Alito’s words: “Therefore, when 
a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the un-
ion must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from 
nonmembers without their affirmative consent.”258 The holding in Knox 
made a major change to existing law in this area as Justices Sotomayor and 
Ginsburg pointed out in their concurrence.259 These two Justices would 
have held for the plaintiffs/nonmembers solely because the union failed to 
send out a new Hudson notice.260 However, they scolded the majority they 
joined for adding the opt-in requirement when the issue was not squarely 
presented in the case.261 As Justice Sotomayor stated: 
I concur only in the judgment, however, because I cannot agree with the 
majority’s decision to address unnecessarily significant constitutional 
issues well outside the scope of the questions presented and briefing. By 
doing so, the majority breaks our own rules and, more importantly, 
disregards principles of judicial restraint that define the Court’s proper role 
in our system of separated powers.262 
The dissenters—Justices Breyer and Kagan—held that the union acted 
properly in this case in not sending a fresh Hudson notice for the mid-year 
                                                 
253 Id. 
254 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012) 
(holding that “the nature of the notice may affect how many employees who object to the 
union’s special assessment will be able to get their money back. The union is not entitled 
to dictate unilaterally the manner in which it advertises the availability of the refund. For 
this reason, we conclude that a live controversy remains, and we proceed to the merits.”). 
255 Id. at 2295–96. 
256 Id. at 2296 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). 
257 Id. (majority opinion). 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 2296 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). 
260 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
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assessment.263 Any nonmembers who object to the mid-year assessment, 
according to Justice Breyer, have two options.264 They may object when the 
current year’s Hudson notice is sent out or they may object via next year’s 
Hudson notice process.265 Either way, the nonmembers will be made whole 
at some point.266 Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Roberts were 
uncomfortable with this process because nonmembers who wait to object 
until the next year are forced to give the union an interest-free loan.267 The 
dissenters also claimed that the Court should not be interfering with the un-
ion’s historical practice of requiring an opt-out for nonmembers to get a re-
fund. In Justice Breyer’s words: 
Where, as here, nonchargeable political expenses are at issue, there 
may be a significant number of represented nonmembers who do not 
feel strongly enough about the union’s politics to indicate a choice 
either way. That being so, an “opt-in” requirement can reduce union 
revenues significantly, a matter of considerable importance to the 
union, while the additional protection it provides primarily helps only 
those who are politically near neutral.... There is no good reason for the 
Court suddenly to enter the debate, much less now to decide that the 
Constitution resolves it.268 
As with the Christopher case, the oral arguments in Knox presaged the 
outcome of the case.269 At the end of the allotted hour it was clear that the 
conservative-leaning Justices disfavored this type of assessment, without 
notice and the ability to object.270 They were most disturbed by the idea 
that this situation provides unions with interest-free loans for speech cer-
tain assessed members do not agree with.271 For example, Justice Alito 
stated that the objecting members 
may have very strong partisan and ideological objections [to the political 
campaign]. So, why should they not be given a notice at that time ... and 
given the opportunity not to give what would be at a minimum ... an 
interest-free loan for the purpose of influencing an election campaign?272 
                                                 
263 Id. at 2307 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). 
264 Id. at 2306. 
265 Id. 
266 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2306. 
267 Id. at 2292–93 (majority opinion). 
268 Id. at 2307 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). 
269 E.g., Christopher Oral Arguments, supra note 217, at 37. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 37–38. 
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Justice Scalia argued that the Court should lean towards requiring a Hudson 
notice whenever the union asks for a “material” new assessment such as this.273 
The liberal-leaning Justices seemed to favor the idea that no Hudson 
notice is required for this type of mid-year assessment because the amount 
spent on political, non-chargeable matters will be deducted from the ob-
jector’s dues the following year.274 Justice Breyer picked up on this idea 
and argued the following: 
[T]he virtue of the present system is that it does require some forced 
loans, that’s true, but it does wash out in the wash, and it ends up being 
fair to the objectors. And it’s simply hard to think of a better system that 
doesn’t provide more administrative problems than the existing one.275 
In the end, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor defected from this viewpoint 
and would have required a fresh Hudson notice for mid-year assessments. 
                                                 
273 Id. at 14. 
274 Id. at 51. 
275 Christopher Oral Arguments, supra note 217, at 52; Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 
Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
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TABLE 8 
KNOX V. SEIU VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Knox v. SEIU | (7-2) 
Justice Vote 
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 2-2 tie 
Ginsburg Majority and Concurrence  
Breyer 
Dissent (author): The Union acted properly in this case as any dis-
crepancies in non-chargeable expenses will wash out in next year’s 
assessment. 
Sotomayor 
Majority and Concurrence (author): The union should have issued 
a fresh Hudson notice but the Court goes too far in requiring non-
members to opt-in to payment. 
Kagan Dissent  






Majority (author): The union violated the nonmembers’ First 
Amendment speech rights by failing to issue a new Hudson notice. 
In the future, nonmembers must opt-in to paying special union 
assessments. 
 
IV. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION CASES 
The Court heard three consumer protection cases over the 2011–2012 
Term, two of which are relevant for their potential to have a significant 
business impact.276 The first case involved a mandatory arbitration clause 
in a credit card contract.277 The clause was pitted against a law granting an 
aggrieved consumer the non-waivable “right to sue” the card issuer.278 The 
Court held that the statutory right to sue was broad enough to encompass a 
lawsuit proceeding through arbitration.279 The second case revolved around 
                                                 
276 See Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034 (2012); CompuCredit Corp. 
v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
277 CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668. 
278 Id. at 669. 
279 Id. at 670. 
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real estate mortgages and settlement fees charged by lenders.280 The Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act bans lenders from giving and receiving 
kickbacks and unearned fees.281 Angry borrowers paid settlement fees 
without a corresponding interest rate decrease—this made the fees “un-
earned” under RESPA.282 The lender argued that RESPA allowed it to 
keep these unearned fees because they were not split with another party.283 
The Court interpreted the statute and ruled that the lender could not both 
give and receive these unearned fees.284 In both cases, consumer protec-
tion went toe-to-toe with business interests and lost (seventeen votes to 
one, to be specific).285 
A. Consumer Protection: Bad Credit, No Credit, and Your Right to Sue a 
Credit Repair Organization 
In CompuCredit v. Greenwood the Justices entertained arguments on the 
juxtaposition of mandatory arbitration clauses and a statutorily granted right 
to sue.286 The issue in Greenwood was whether such arbitration clauses 
trump a consumer’s express right to sue a credit repair organization for un-
fair and deceptive practices.287 Credit repair organizations288 flourished after 
the Great Recession and the corresponding consumer credit devastation.289 
                                                 
280 Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2036. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 2038–39. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 2041. 
285 Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2044; CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673. 
286 CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668–69. 
287 Id. at 669–70. 
288 The Credit Repair Organization Act defines credit repair organizations as follows: 
[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the 
mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will 
sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money 
or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of (i) 
improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or 
(ii) providing advice or assistance to any consumer with regard to any 
activity or service described in [other sections of the statute]. 
See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-455 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1679 
(2012)), at §§ 1679A(3)(A)(i), (ii). 
289 See, e.g., What You Should Know About Credit Repair Companies, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (May 3, 2010), http://www.privacyrights.org/credit-repair-companies 
[hereinafter Companies] (stating that while “the economy has faltered in recent years credit 
repair companies have flourished”); Susan Tompor, Consumers’ Credit Scores Improving 
(May 14, 2012), LOANSAFE.ORG (May 14, 2012), http://www.loansafe.org/susan-tom 
por-consumers-credit-scores-improving (stating that credit scores “turned into one ugly 
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The process of repairing consumer credit benefitted some by rejuvenating 
credit scores and ability to borrow,290 and harmed others by offering prod-
ucts unlikely to help economically weak borrowers.291 Long before the re-
cent turbulent economic times, Congress offered protection to consumers 
with poor credit via the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA).292 CROA 
outlaws unfair/deceitful credit practices and unintelligible legalese in credit 
repair transactions.293 More specifically, the law contains mandatory disclo-
sure provisions, rules governing consumer credit contracts (and consumer 
contact more generally), and cancellation rights for credit repair recipi-
ents.294 An important disclosure provision in CROA informs consumers: 
“You have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit 
Repair Organization Act.”295 The statute also states that consumers cannot 
waive this statutorily granted right to sue.296 
Greenwood involved special credit cards marketed and sent to individ-
uals in need of credit repair; the cards were touted as having attractive 
credit limits and included the typical terms and conditions contract that no 
one reads.297 One such section covered mandatory arbitration and stated: 
                                                                                                                         
number for many consumers throughout the recession—putting a halt to how much buying 
and borrowing consumers could do”). 
290 See, e.g., Tompor, supra note 289 (discussing the uptick in consumer credit quality 
and stating, “it’s pretty upbeat news to hear that more consumers are edging near perfect 
FICO scores. The number of consumers in the top FICO score range—800 to 850—is 
now at the highest level since October 2008, according to researchers at FICO Labs.”). 
291 See, e.g., Companies, supra note 289 (listing common consumer protection issues 
with credit repair companies and stating: “If you’re losing sleep over bad credit, ads 
promising a quick fix can seem like a dream come true. But, hook up with the wrong 
company and your dreams of clean credit can quickly turn into a living nightmare.”). 
292 15 U.S.C. § 1679. 
293 Id. 
294 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679B(a)(i) (banning misleading statements to consumers); 1679C(a) 
(codifying the CROA’s disclosure requirements); 1679D (discussing consumer contact 
and the contract terms required by credit repair organizations pertaining to such contact); 
and 1679E (codifying the consumer’s right to cancel a credit contract without fees or 
penalties for a certain period of time). 
295 The relevant mandatory disclosure provision reads: “Any credit repair organization 
shall provide any consumer with the following written statement before any contract or 
agreement between the consumer and the credit repair organization is executed: .... You 
have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization 
Act. ...” 15 U.S.C. § 1679C(a) (emphasis added). 
296 15 U.S.C. § 1679F(A) (stating that “[a]ny waiver by any consumer of any protection 
provided by or any right of the consumer under this title—(1) shall be treated as void; and 
(2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person”). 
297 See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668; see also Connie Prater, 
U.S. Credit Card Agreements Unreadable to 4 out of 5 Adults, CREDITCARDS.COM (July 
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“Any claim, dispute or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise) 
at any time arising from or relating to your Account ... upon the election of 
you or us, will be resolved by binding arbitration.”298 A group of cardhold-
ers filed a class action in federal court alleging violations of CROA such as 
initiation fees that effectively lowered the advertised credit limit.299 The 
lower federal courts denied CompuCredit’s motion to compel arbitration 
because of the express right to sue granted to aggrieved consumers in the 
statute.300 CompuCredit argued that right to sue provisions are generally 
interpreted as including arbitration as a valid forum.301 The class action 
plaintiffs disagreed.302 
The Justices, forming an eight to one majority, reversed and reiterated 
the strong federal policy behind the Federal Arbitration Act favoring arbi-
tration over trials.303 Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion and 
opined that, if Congress wanted the right to sue to mean only a trial, Con-
gress would have expressly barred arbitration.304 Instead, the right-to-sue 
clause is located in the consumer disclosure section and is merely a colloquial 
                                                                                                                         
22, 2010), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-agreement-readabili
ty-1282.php (stating that credit card “agreements contain the fine print of the credit card 
terms and dictate how millions of credit cards issued in the United States may be used. 
Banks and credit unions mail them when card users first open their accounts or when 
customers request copies. They are often put away in a drawer or tossed with the junk 
mail. Credit counselors and consumer advocates say the truth is that very few cardholders 
ever read their agreements—until something goes wrong.”). 
298 CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. (stating that the “District Court denied the defendants’ motion to compel 
arbitration of the claims, concluding that ‘Congress intended claims under the CROA to 
be non-arbitrable.’ A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed ....”) (internal citations omitted). 
301 Id. at 669 (writing that the Ninth Circuit also accepted this position in its holding 
for the class action plaintiffs). The Court stated that the “Ninth Circuit adopted the fol-
lowing line of reasoning, urged upon us by respondents here: The disclosure provision 
gives consumers the ‘right to sue,’ which ‘clearly involves the right to bring an action in 
a court of law.’” Id. 
302 Id. at 670 (reiterating the class action plaintiffs’ argument that “the CROA’s civil-
liability provision ... demonstrates that [CROA] provides consumers with a ‘right’ to 
bring an action in court. They cite the provision’s repeated use of the terms ‘action,’ 
‘class action,’ and ‘court’—terms that they say call to mind a judicial proceeding.”) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
303 Id. at 669 (stating that the FAA “requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate 
according to their terms.... That is the case even when the claims at issue are federal 
statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congres-
sional command.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
304 Id. at 673. 
440 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:385 
way of informing consumers that courts can award them damages for inju-
ries arising under the act.305 The opinion continued, “[w]e think most con-
sumers would understand it this way, without regard to whether the suit in 
court has to be preceded by an arbitration proceeding.”306 Justice Ginsburg 
dissented and reiterated her concerns from the oral argument as follows: 
The CROA differs from the statutes we have construed in the past .... 
The Act does not merely create a claim for relief. It designates that 
claim as an action entailing a “right to sue”; mandates that consumers 
be informed, prior to entering any contract, of that right; and precludes 
the waiver of any “right” conferred by the Act.307 
TABLE 9 
COMPUCREDIT V. GREENWOOD VOTE BREAKDOWN 
CompuCredit v. Greenwood | (8-1) 
Justice Vote 
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 3-1 for majority 




Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 for majority 






B. Consumer Protection: Residential Mortgages, Unearned Fees, and Kickbacks 
In Freeman v. Quicken Loans, the Court scrutinized the federal Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) and its bar against certain 
                                                 
305 Id. at 672 (stating that the right to sue clause is a “colloquial method of 
communicating to consumers that they have the legal right, enforceable in court, to 
recover damages from credit repair organizations that violate the CROA”). 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 679 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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kickbacks and unearned fees.308 RESPA governs much of the real estate 
closing/settlement process for residential mortgage loans.309 Kickbacks 
and referral fees (generally paid to real estate agents, builders, and title 
insurance agents for referring borrowers to particular lenders) were com-
mon before RESPA and are barred because they increase mortgage 
costs.310 The statute bans both kickbacks and unearned fees in two consec-
utive provisions.311 The operative language for the kickback ban reads: 
No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or 
thing of value pursuant to any agreement or understanding, oral or 
otherwise, that business incident to or a part of a real estate settlement 
service involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to 
any person.312 
The very similar operative language for the unearned fee ban reads: 
No person shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or 
percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real 
estate settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a 
federally related mortgage loan other than for services actually 
performed [for example, unearned fees].313 
The statute provides consumers a private right of action to recover an 
amount equal to three times the unlawful charge paid by the plaintiff for 
                                                 
308 132 S. Ct. 2034 (2012). 
309 See Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1727 (Dec. 22, 1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601–2617). The statute defines the settlement process as including: 
[A]ny service provided in connection with a real estate settlement 
including, but not limited to, the following: title searches, title 
examinations, the provision of title certificates, title insurance, services 
rendered by an attorney, the preparation of documents, property surveys, 
the rendering of credit reports or appraisals, pest and fungus inspections, 
services rendered by a real estate agent or broker, the origination of a 
federally related mortgage loan (including, but not limited to, the taking 
of loan applications, loan processing, and the underwriting and funding 
of loans), and the handling of the processing, and closing or settlement .... 
12 U.S.C. § 2602(3). 
310 See More Information About RESPA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ram
h/res/respamor (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
311 See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (barring the gift and receipt of kickbacks); 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) 
(barring the gift and receipt of unearned fees). 
312 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (emphasis added). 
313 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (emphasis added). 
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the settlement service at issue.314 A separate provision also allows for 
criminal penalties of up to one year in prison or up to a $10,000 fine.315 
The plaintiffs in Freeman (three married couples) applied for mortgages 
through Quicken Loans and asserted they were charged fees for services 
they never received.316 More specifically, they sued based on loan discount, 
loan processing, and loan origination fees for which they received no corre-
sponding interest rate reductions.317 Quicken removed the case to federal 
court, where the three actions were consolidated and then petitioned for 
summary judgment.318 Quicken claimed that RESPA violations require un-
earned fees to be split between a lender and another party based on the stat-
utory language of “give” and “accept.”319 In other words, one party must 
give part of an unearned fee and another party must accept it for a violation 
to occur.320 It defies the English language for a lender to both give itself and 
receive unto itself the same kickback or unearned fee. The borrower/plaintiffs 
relied on a 2001 Department of Housing and Urban Development policy 
statement that interpreted the RESPA provisions at issue as not being limited 
to fee splitting situations.321 The district court granted summary judgment 
for Quicken and a split panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed.322 
                                                 
314 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2). 
315 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(1). 
316 These plaintiffs filed three separate actions in a Louisiana state court in 2008. See 
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2038 (2012) (identifying the plaintiffs 
and stating that “the Freemans and the Bennetts allege that they were charged loan 
discount fees of $980 and $1,100, respectively, but that respondent did not give them 
lower interest rates in return. The Smiths’ allegations focus on a $575 loan ‘processing 
fee’ and a ‘loan origination’ fee of more than $5,100.”). 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 2039. 
320 Id. 
321 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification of 
Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and Guid-
ance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53,059 (Oct. 18, 2001). 
HUD’s consumer protection functions under RESPA were transferred to the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. See Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2039–40, 2103–04, 2112 
(July 21, 2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). The Bureau has issued a 
notice stating that “it would enforce HUD’s RESPA regulations and that, pending further 
Bureau action, it would apply HUD’s previously issued official policy statements regarding 
RESPA.” Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection: Identification of Enforceable Rules 
and Orders, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,569-01 (July 21, 2011), stating more specifically that the 
CFPB will give due consideration to the application of other written 
guidance, interpretations, and policy statements issued prior to July 21, 
2011, by a transferor agency [i.e., HUD] in light of all relevant factors, 
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The Court unanimously affirmed that RESPA allows lenders to keep 
one hundred percent of unearned mortgage settlement fees.323 The statuto-
ry text is clear that a violation occurs only when any part of an unearned 
fee is “split” with other parties.324 Justice Scalia called the HUD policy 
statement relied on by the plaintiffs an overreach and not entitled to defer-
ence as it “goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear.”325 The 
Court looked at the normal usage of the words “give” and “receive” to de-
termine that it would be irrational to interpret this provision as covering a 
lender that gives and accepts the same fee.326 
The Court concluded its opinion sternly. The plaintiffs argued that 
RESPA targets unreasonably high settlement fees in general; this makes it 
proper to interpret its provisions as barring all unearned fees and kick-
backs regardless of whether they are split.327 The majority, however, la-
beled this argument as outside of Congressional intent.328 He continued 
that borrowers who charged excessive or dishonest mortgage-based fees 
have state law fraud actions at their disposal.329 These RESPA provisions, 
on the other hand, are purposefully limited only to split fees because Con-
gress believed: (1) that state law fraud remedies were inadequate to pre-
vent fee splitting and kickbacks, and (2) that federal legislative action was 
necessary to protect consumers from these harmful practices.330 
                                                                                                                         
including: whether the agency had rulemaking authority for the law in 
question; the formality of the document in question and the weight 
afforded it by the issuing agency; the persuasiveness of the document; 
and whether the document conflicts with guidance or interpretations 
issued by another agency. 
Id. 
322 Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 2009 WL 2448033, at *22–23 (E.D. La., Aug. 10, 
2009), aff’d, 626 F.3d 799, 800, 806 (5th Cir. 2010). 
323 Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2041–42, 2044. 
324 Id. at 2042. 
325 Id. at 2040 (internal citations omitted). 
326 Id. at 2040. 
327 Id. at 2043–44. 
328 Id. at 2044. 
329 Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2041. 
330 Id. at 2044. 
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TABLE 10 
FREEMAN V. QUICKEN LOANS VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Freeman v. Quicken Loans | (9-0) 
Justice Vote 





Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 for majority 
Scalia 
Majority (author): RESPA only prohibits splitting unearned real 
estate settlement fees between a lender and at least one other par-






The Term’s consumer protection cases demonstrate the Roberts Court 
favoring business interests over consumer interests. Granted, the sample 
size of two cases is small and the issues are limited to credit repair organi-
zations and residential mortgage settlement services. Viewed via a wider 
lens, however, the cases cover two issues responsible for the Great Reces-
sion and key to America’s economic recovery: (1) consumer credit and 
(2) real estate.331 In the end, business interests garnered seventeen votes 
and consumer protection interest garnered one. The final case-analysis sec-
tion infra looks at the lone securities law case on the 2011–2012 docket. 
                                                 
331 See, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, What Caused the Economic Crisis? The 15 Best 
Explanations for the Great Recession, SLATE.COM (Jan. 9, 2010, 6:59 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2010/01/what_caused_the_economic
_crisis.html. 
There are no strong candidates for what logicians call a sufficient 
condition—a single factor that would have caused the [Great Recession] in 
the absence of any others. There are, however, a number of plausible 
necessary conditions—factors without which the crisis would not have 
occurred. Most analysts find former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan at fault, 
though for a variety of reasons. Conservative economists—ever worried 
about inflation—tend to fault Greenspan for keeping interest rates too low 
between 2003 and 2005 as the real estate and credit bubbles inflated. 
Id. 
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V. THE LONE SECURITIES REGULATION CASE 
The Court’s lone securities regulation case involved the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (colloquially called the ’34 Act).332 In Credit Suisse Se-
curities v. Simmonds, the Justices examined a shareholder’s right under the 
’34 Act to sue corporate insiders who engage in certain short swing securi-
ties trades.333 Directors, officers, and principal shareholders owning more 
than ten percent of any class of a company’s securities are classified as in-
siders for purposes of this analysis.334 More specifically, the ’34 Act states: 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may 
have been obtained by [insiders] by reason of [their] relationship to the 
[company], any profit realized ... from any purchase and sale ... within 
any period of less than six months ... shall inure to and be recoverable by 
the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of [the insiders] in 
entering into such transaction .... 
[Lawsuits] to recover such profit may be instituted ... by the [company], 
or by the owner of any security of the [company] in the name and in 
behalf of the [company] ... but no such suit shall be brought more than 
two years after the date such profit was realized.335 
Many interesting discussion topics arise from this statutory language. 
One of the most notable is the mandate that any profits from short swing 
trades “shall inure to and be recoverable” by the company.336 That is an 
extraordinary concept because all profits earned within a six-month period 
by a corporate insider, even if made without inside information or bad in-
tent, must be returned or disgorged to the company.337 In other words, the 
’34 Act makes it unprofitable for insiders to trade in the short-term so that 
they will hold their shares for the long-term and, theoretically, work in the 
company’s as well as their own best interests.338 
The gravamen of the Credit Suisse case, however, revolves around the 
last sentence supra—the two-year deadline for shareholders to file suit against 
insiders trading within the six-month window.339 Assume an insider knows 
it is illegal to trade within the restricted period. It follows that the same 
investor, who has already broken the law, will be savvy enough to keep the 
trade quiet. Under these circumstances, how are individual shareholders to 
                                                 
332 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a). 
333 Credit Suisse Sec.(USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417–19 (2012). 
334 Id. at 1418. 
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know when corporate insiders finalize short swing trades so that they may 
exercise their statutorily granted right to sue within the two-year deadline? 
According to the plaintiff in Credit Suisse, section 16(a) of the ’34 Act 
provides some guidance.340 That section requires corporate insiders to file a 
so-called Form 4341 with the Securities and Exchange Commission every 
time their ownership holdings in the company change. Form 4s must be 
filed within two days after trades of company stock are finalized.342 The 
plaintiff argued that any deadline must be tolled until shareholders have the 
opportunity to see the Form 4 and learn of the trades. Sections 16(a) and 
16(b) were scrutinized together to form the question presented in this case.343 
The plaintiff in Credit Suisse proves to be one of the most resourceful 
found in any case this Term. In 2007, Vanessa Simmonds filed fifty-five 
actions (that is not a misprint) against various financial institutions that 
served as underwriters of initial public offerings in the late 1990s and ear-
ly 2000s.344 At the time, she was a twenty-two-year-old college senior; her 
father served as one of her attorneys in the case.345 She sued as an individ-
ual shareholder in the name of each company of which she owned stock 
seeking more than $500 million in stock sales.346 In a typical complaint, 
“she alleged that the underwriters and the [company] insiders employed 
various mechanisms to inflate the aftermarket price of the stock to a level above 
the IPO price, allowing them to profit from the aftermarket sale.”347 Another 
allegation in the same complaint stated that, as a group, “the underwriters and 
[company] insiders owned in excess of ten percent of the outstanding 
stock during the relevant time period, which subjected them to both dis-
gorgement of profits under § 16(b) and the reporting requirements of 
                                                 
340 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1418 (2012). 
341 See Reports of Directors, Officers and Principal Shareholders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 
(2012) (stating in section 240.16a-3(a) that “[s]tatements of changes in beneficial owner-
ship required by that section shall be filed on Form 4”). 
342 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(c) (2012) (reading, “if there has been a change in such own-
ership ... [the insider must file the Form 4] before the end of the second business day 
following the day on which the subject transaction has been executed, or at such other 
time as the Commission shall establish, by rule, in any case in which the Commission 
determines that such 2-day period is not feasible”). 
343 Credit Suisse, 132 S.Ct. at 1417–18. 
344 Id. at 1418. 
345 See, e.g., Rami Grunbaum, Vanessa vs. The Dot-Com IPO Giants, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/20
03992306_sundaybuzz04.html. 
346 Id. (“How did Vanessa Simmonds, barely a teen in the dot-com heyday, get involved? 
Her shares—a ‘relatively small’ number of each—were acquired this summer by her dad. 
Under 16(b), it’s not required that she owned shares when the alleged misdeeds occurred.”). 
347 Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418. 
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§ 16(a).”348 Amazingly, this was the first time a plaintiff has used this line 
of attack to force disgorgement.349 The underwriters never filed Form 4s 
for these trades and argued that they were exempted because they did not 
fit within the definition of corporate insiders.350 
A major argument in the case was whether the limitations period was a 
statute of repose (which may never be extended or tolled) or a statute of 
limitations (which may be extended for extraordinary reasons).351 Sim-
monds argued that the time limit should be tolled at least until the insider 
files the required 16(a) disclosure or Form 4.352 Credit Suisse argued that 
claims like Simmonds’s are “never subject to equitable tolling because the 
statute requires that no suit ‘shall be brought more than two years after the 
date that such profit was realized.’”353 The issue is relevant because Sim-
monds’s case ran into serious problems because she filed her legal action 
in this case far past two years since the insiders’ “profit was realized.”354 
The district court granted summary judgment for the underwriters on 
twenty-four of Simmonds’s claims, finding them to be time barred.355 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, in relevant part adopting Simmonds’s argument and 
finding that the two-year deadline should be tolled until an insider files a 
Form 4.356 The court argued that tolling could occur regardless of whether 
the plaintiff “knew or should have known of the conduct at issue.”357 The 
Ninth Circuit laid out three potential interpretations of section 16(b) based 
on circuit precedent and chose the third interpretation: 
[Interpretation One:] a “strict” approach under which the statute is 
treated as a statute of repose—that is, a firm bar that is not subject to 
                                                 
348 Id. 
349 See, e.g., Grunbaum, supra note 345 (stating that “despite the widespread investi-
gation and litigation of abuses surrounding the IPOs that ballooned in 1999–2001 and 
then popped, no one has used their line of attack before”). 
350 Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418. 
351 Id. 
352 See, e.g., Steven Kaufhold, Opinion Analysis: Occupying the “Reasonable Middle 
Ground” on Tolling of Insider Trading Claims, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 28, 2012, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=142064. 
353 Id. Additionally, Credit Suisse argued that it did not count as a beneficial owner of 
securities as required by section 16 because it was a mere underwriter of another company’s 
securities. Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 n.4 (“Petitioners have consistently disputed 
§ 16’s application to them, arguing that they, as underwriters, are generally exempt from the 
statute’s coverage.”). 
354 See Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418. 
355 In re Section 16(b) Litigation, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205, 1216, 1218 (2009). 
356 Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2011). 
357 Id. at 1095. 
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tolling; [Interpretation Two:] a “notice” or “discovery” approach ... 
“under which the time period is tolled until the Corporation had 
sufficient information to put it on notice of its potential § 16(b) claim”; 
and [Interpretation Three:] a “disclosure” approach “under which the 
time period is tolled until the insider discloses the transactions at issue 
in his mandatory § 16(a) reports.”358 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 
that the two-year time limit in section 16(b) may not be tolled until the 
corporate insider files the required Form 4.359 The Court agreed that equi-
table tolling may apply to these 16(b) cases but never past the point at 
which the shareholder knew or should have known of the short swing 
trades.360 This is the “reasonable middle ground” position advocated by 
the United States in its briefs and at oral arguments as well as Interpreta-
tion Two from the Ninth Circuit opinion.361 In the end, the Court remand-
ed the case to the lower courts to determine if and how tolling might apply 
to this specific case.362 One factor on remand will surely be that Sim-
monds seemed to know many details about the short swing transactions 
even though the insiders did not file Form 4s.363 
Bear in mind that the unanimous opinion in this case is somewhat mis-
leading. All eight Justices participating agreed that the disclosure option 
(that is, Interpretation Three from the Ninth Circuit opinion) was not Con-
gress’s intention in drafting section 16(b).364 The majority broke down, 
however, on the issue of whether section 16(b) provides a statute of repose 
or a statute of limitations.365 No tally was given as to which Justices ended 
                                                 
358 See id. at 1095 (citing Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
359 Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1421. 
360 Id. (“Having determined that § 16(b)’s limitations period is not tolled until the fil-
ing of a § 16(a) statement, we remand for the lower courts to consider how the usual rules 
of equitable tolling apply to the facts of this case.”). 
361 See Kaufhold, supra note 352. 
362 See Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1421. 
363 Justice Scalia stated it this way: 
The oddity of Simmonds’ position is well demonstrated by the 
circumstances of this case. Under the [Ninth Circuit] rule, because 
petitioners have yet to file § 16(a) statements (as noted earlier they do not 
think themselves subject to that requirement), Simmonds still has two 
years to bring suit, even though she is so well aware of her alleged cause 
of action that she has already sued. If § 16(a) statements were, as 
Simmonds suggests, indispensable to a party’s ability to sue, Simmonds 
would not be here. 
Id. at 1420. 
364 Id. at 1418–19. 
365 Id. at 1421. 
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up in each camp—the Court merely stated that “[w]e are divided 4 to 4 con-
cerning, and thus affirm without precedential effect, the Court of Appeals’ 
rejection of petitioners’ contention that § 16(b) establishes a period of re-
pose that is not subject to tolling.”366 Because the Chief Justice recused 
himself, the Court was able to split evenly in the voting367—an awful situa-
tion in the legal world because a plurality opinion holds no precedential 
weight. Based on oral arguments from the case, it would seem like an ideo-
logical split took place on this issue. 
During questioning, the conservative-leaning Justices seemed to favor 
the statute of repose option that would limit the deadline to bring a lawsuit 
at two years after trades become final. The following are key comments by 
Justices Scalia and Alito demonstrating this position. Justices Kennedy 
(somewhat unusually) and Thomas (somewhat predictably) were silent 
throughout oral arguments. 
JUSTICE ALITO: “Well, if you were drafting a statute of 
repose, how would you phrase it other than the way [sec-
tion 16(b)] is phrased?”368 
JUSTICE SCALIA (to the counsel for Ms. Simmonds): “[T]he 
problem I have with your argument is it’s a very strange 
statute of limitations.... And you want to say what it means is 
you have 2 years from the time [the short swing trade] was 
reported. Congress would have said that. It’s so easy [for 
Congress] to say that. Two years from the reporting.”369 
If this Article’s theory that four conservative-leaning Justices voted for 
a state of repose proves correct (and no one may ever discover the four to 
four vote breakdown), the four liberal-leaning Justices must have voted for 
the statute of limitations option. In oral arguments, the liberal-leaning Jus-
tices were quite active in favor of a statute of limitations. The following 
are key comments by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan: 
JUSTICE KAGAN: “Congress surely knew how to write a 
statute of repose because it did it in this statute, but it didn’t 
                                                 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 1414. 
368 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012) (No. 10-
1261) [hereinafter Credit Suisse Oral Arguments]. 
369 Id. at 45–46. 
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do it with respect to these kinds of violations. This statute 
of limitations, I’m going to call it, reads very differently ....”370 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: “Tell me what logic there is in 
reading this as a statute of repose ....”371 She continued, “if 
Congress understood that some wouldn’t do the statutory 
requirement and file [a Form 4] in a timely manner, why 
wouldn’t equitable tolling be a more appropriate way to 
look at this?”372 
JUSTICE BREYER: “[W]hy not just treat it like a ... regular 
statute of limitations? You say that the profit is made on 
day one. It was made by an insider, and if your client finds 
out about it or reasonably should have found out about it, 
then the statute begins to run.... Otherwise it’s tolled, 
period. Simple, same as every other statute. What’s wrong 
with that?”373 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: “Here we just say—it just has what 
seems to me a plain vanilla statute of limitations that is 
traditionally subject to waiver, equitable tolling. We don’t 
have that special kind of statute that gives you one limit 
and then sets a further limit that will be the outer limit.”374 
                                                 
370 Id. at 8. 
371 Id. at 10. 
372 Id. 
373 Id. at 39. 
374 Credit Suisse Oral Arguments, supra note 369, at 45–46. 
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TABLE 11 
CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES V. SIMMONDS VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds | (8-0) and (4-4) 
Justice Vote 
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority | 4-0 § 16(b) is a statute of 
limitations 
Ginsburg Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Ginsburg held that 16(b) is a statute of limitations 
Breyer Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Breyer held that 16(b) is a statute of limitations 
Sotomayor Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Sotomayor held that 16(b) is a statute of limitations 
Kagan Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Kagan held that 16(b) is a statute of limitations 
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority | 4-0 § 16(b) is a stat-
ute of repose 
Scalia Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Scalia held that 16(b) is a statute of repose 
Kennedy Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Kennedy held that 16(b) is a stat-ute of repose 
Thomas Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Thomas held that 16(b) is a stat-ute of repose 
Roberts Recused 
Alito Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Alito held that 16(b) is a statute of repose 
 
Credit Suisse is the one business impact case of the eleven where the 
Court found itself in a major ideological split. The unanimous majority took 
the middle ground between (1) protecting the interests of small shareholders 
and (2) removing the potential of endless litigation hovering over the heads 
of corporate insiders.375 In choosing the middle ground approach, however, 
the liberal-leaning Justices conceded the chance to increase protection for 
small shareholders and potentially eliminate short swing transactions by in-
siders. On the other hand, the conservative-leaning Justices wanted to lessen 
the impact of section 16(b) on corporate insiders but were forced into the 
middle ground. The business interests are likely to prevail on remand be-
cause Simmonds knew so much about their financial gains even though no 
Form 4s were filed. This means that the statute of limitations began to run 
at the point she obtained this knowledge or, as the district court held, 
“there is no dispute that all of the facts giving rise to Ms. Simmonds’s 
                                                 
375 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1421 (2012). 
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complaints against [petitioners] were known ... for at least five years be-
fore these cases were filed.”376 If true, these facts bar Simmonds’s case 
even if the courts on remand apply equitable tolling. 
Finally, parties choosing to sue corporate insiders under section 16(b) 
are more likely to resemble the sophisticated plaintiff in this case than the 
average shareholder holding only a few hundred shares in a 401(k). It is 
likely that these savvy plaintiffs will obtain short swing transaction infor-
mation even without a Form 4 filing by insiders. Therefore, the real-world 
impact of this case will substantially limit their time limit to file suit. This 
limitation on shareholder power is a boon to business interests. Part VI 
infra takes on the Court’s health care cases to (1) determine whether they 
pass the business impact rubric and (2) finding that they pass, analyze the 
vote breakdown and their impact on business. 
VI. THE COURT’S THREE HEALTH CARE CASES 
This Article would not be complete without a discussion of the Afforda-
ble Care Act cases and their potential impact on business. In March 2012, the 
Court faced one of the most controversial sets of oral arguments in its histo-
ry—so significant, in fact, that the Justices granted six hours of oral argument 
between the three health care cases.377 So what was all the hoopla about? 
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) on March 23, 2010.378 The law spans 900 pages and its primary goal 
is to “increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and de-
crease the cost of health care.”379 The ACA seeks to accomplish these goals 
in many ways but a few prominent provisions stand out: (1) the ACA requires 
insurance companies to insure everyone who applies (guaranteed issue),380 
(2) the ACA bars insurance companies from charging individuals with pre-
existing conditions higher premiums (community rating),381 (3) the ACA in-
creases Medicaid coverage to people with incomes up to 133% above the 
poverty line (Medicaid expansion),382 and (4) the ACA mandates that the 
                                                 
376 See id. at 1421 n.8. 
377 See, e.g., Richard Wolf, 3 Epic Days: Health Care Law Reaches High Court, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/story/2012-03-26/su
preme-court-health-care/53768996/1. 
378 The Affordable Care Act Becomes Law, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare
.gov/law/timeline/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
379 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2571 (2012). 
380 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012). 
381 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b). 
382 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012). 
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vast majority of American citizens obtain insurance or pay a “penalty” 
(individual mandate).383 
The controversy that stirred when the bill was first debated in Congress 
escalated after its enactment—particularly over the Medicaid expansion and 
the individual mandate. Thirteen states immediately sued the federal gov-
ernment challenging the constitutionality of these provisions and the ACA 
in general.384 Eventually thirteen more states and the National Federation of 
Independent Business joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs.385 The basic argument 
the plaintiffs made was twofold: (1) Congress did not have the constitutional 
authority to pass the ACA under the Commerce Clause because people with-
out insurance are not currently engaged in interstate commerce, and (2) the 
mandate’s penalty clause did not impose a tax and, therefore, was not within 
Congress’s power to “lay and collect taxes.”386 The stage was set for the cas-
es to be heard in United States’ highest court. 
Before undertaking any analysis of the outcomes of these cases it is cru-
cial to answer the following question: Do health care focused cases pass the 
business impact rubric and merit a place in the discussion of cases likely to 
significantly impact the business arena? This Section walks through that 
analysis. First, health care, health insurance, and government health care 
programs like Medicaid are not classic and well-established business law 
topics. They are covered neither in business law courses nor in the promi-
nent business law textbooks. However, Constitutional Law and Congress’s 
Commerce and Tax power are classic and well-established business law 
topics. Viewing the case via this constitutional lens rather than the health 
care lens allows the cases to pass through rubric input #1. This is a fair 
viewing because it is likely that the Court’s ACA opinion will find its way 
into both academic and practitioner discussions surrounding business law 
for years to come. Input #2 is more easily surmounted as eight business-
related groups filed amicus briefs in the ACA cases.387 
                                                 
383 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
384 See, e.g., State Attorneys General Against the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/State_Attorneys
_General_Against_the_Patient_Protection_and_Affordable_Care_Act_of_2010 (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013). 
385 The States’ Lawsuit Challenging the Constitutionality of the Health Care Reform 
Law, HEALTH CARE LAWSUIT, http://www.healthcarelawsuit.us/ (last visited Mar. 23, 
2013) (listing the state plaintiffs as Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
386 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580–81 (2012). 
387 Eight business-related groups filed amicus briefs in this case: (1) a combined brief 
filed for the Service Employees International Union and Change to Win, (2) a combined 
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Rubric input #3 is surmounted because business-focused facts predom-
inate if the case is viewed through the Commerce Clause lens. Although 
the majority ultimately ruled this was a tax case under Congress’s Article I 
taxing power, Justice Robert’s opinion spent sixteen pages addressing and 
dismissing the plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause arguments.388 There are other 
business-focused facts that also play dominant roles in the case. Business-
es employing more than fifty people in 2014 will be forced to provide in-
surance for their employees under the ACA.389 Covered employers who 
fail to provide such insurance will pay a $2000 fine per year, per full time 
employee.390 By 2014, states must set up Small Business Health Options 
Programs where smaller businesses and individuals may purchase health 
insurance coverage.391 Some small businesses of fewer than twenty-five 
employees may also receive tax credits for providing group health insur-
ance plans to their employees.392 The stock market took note as well; the 
day the opinion came out, stock prices of hospital corporations rose dra-
matically while insurance company shares fell.393 Clearly, business-related 
facts played a dominant role in these cases and, therefore, input #3 is sur-
mounted as well. Finally, under the same theory, the Commerce Clause 
was one of the dominant constitutional provisions in the cases allowing 
them to pass input #4. Table 12 encapsulates why the ACA cases made the 
cut as significant business impact cases from the 2011–2012 Term. 
                                                                                                                         
brief filed for the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, (3) a combined brief filed for the Small Business Majority Foundation and 
the Main Street Alliance, (4) the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, (5) Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, (6) America’s Health 
Insurance Plans, (7) the American Hospital Association, and (8) the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of America. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v. 
Florida, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/u-s-department-of
-health-and-human-services-v-florida/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
388 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–94. 
389 Florida v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1260 (11th Cir. 2011). 
390 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012) (stating also that the number of employees will be re-
duced by 30 for purposes of assessing the $2000 fines). 




393 Obamacare’s Insurance Rule Is Upheld by Supreme Court, CNBC.COM (June 28, 
2012, 12:45 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47946647/Obamacare_s_Insurance_Rule_Is
_Upheld_by_Supreme_Court (showing the stock changes in different industries after the 
option was released). 
2013] THE CONST., THE ROBERTS COURT, AND BUSINESS 455 
TABLE 12 























































Three primary questions faced the Court in the ACA cases: 
1. “Whether Congress had the power under Article I of the 
Constitution to enact the [individual mandate] provision” 
and “[w]hether the suit brought by respondents to challenge 
the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act is barred by the Anti-Injunction 
Act?”394 
2. Whether the Affordable Care Act must be invalidated in its 
entirety because it is nonseverable from the individual 
mandate that exceeds Congress’s limited and enumerated 
powers under the Constitution?395 
3. “Does Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate 
basic principles of federalism when it coerces States into 
accepting onerous conditions that it could not impose 
directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding 
under the single largest grant-in-aid program,” or “does the 
                                                 
394 See, e.g., Issue: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/u-s-department-of-health-and
-human-services-v-florida/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
395 See, e.g., Issue: National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-federation-of-independ
ent-business-v-sebelius/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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limitation on Congress’s spending power that this Court 
recognized in South Dakota v. Dole ... no longer apply?”396 
After months of waiting and high drama, the Court released its ACA 
opinion and answered each of these questions.397 The three cases were con-
solidated into one very long opinion announced as one of the Court’s last acts 
of the Term. In a surprise to most Court observers, the Chief Justice joined 
the liberal-leaning Justices to uphold the individual mandate. The majority 
first declared that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar the Court from hearing 
the case because Congress declared the fine for failure to purchase insurance 
as a penalty as opposed to a tax.398 The majority then, rather awkwardly to 
the lay observer, found that the individual mandate was not constitutional un-
der the Congress’s Commerce Clause power but was constitutional under 
Congress’s taxing power.399 In the words of Chief Justice Roberts: 
[The ACA] statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance 
than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution 
allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize 
such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. 
And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if 
fairly possible, that [the individual mandate penalty] can be interpreted as 
a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no 
basis to adopt such a saving construction. 
The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy 
health insurance. [The individual mandate] would therefore be 
unconstitutional if read as a command. The Federal Government does 
have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance. [The 
individual mandate] is therefore constitutional, because it can reasonably 
be read as a tax. 
.... 
The Affordable Care Act is constitutional in part and unconstitutional in 
part. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. That Clause authorizes 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order individuals to 
engage in it. In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what 
Congress has done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain 
                                                 
396 See, e.g., Issue: Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/florida-v-department-of-health-and-human-ser
vices/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (emphasis added). 
397 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
398 Id. at 2583. Chief Justice Roberts stated the reasoning as follows: “The Affordable 
Care Act does not require that the penalty for failing to comply with the individual 
mandate be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction 
Act therefore does not apply to this suit, and we may proceed to the merits.” Id. at 2584. 
399 See infra note 400 and accompanying text. 
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amount of income, but choose to go without health insurance. Such 
legislation is within Congress’s power to tax.400 
The majority then struck down the Medicaid expansion because it 
threatened to take away the states’ existing Medicaid funds as well as with-
hold new Medicaid funds.401 This was a form of unconstitutional coercion. 
The opinion stated: 
Congress has no authority to order the States to regulate according to 
its instructions. Congress may offer the States grants and require the 
States to comply with accompanying conditions, but the States must 
have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer. The States are given 
no such choice in this case: They must either accept a basic change in 
the nature of Medicaid, or risk losing all Medicaid funding. The remedy 
for that constitutional violation is to preclude the Federal Government 
from imposing such a sanction.402 
The majority ended by holding that the striking down of the Medicaid 
expansion did not require the entire ACA to be struck down.403 Justice 
Ginsburg and the other liberal-leaning Justices filed a concurrence agreeing 
that the ACA is: (1) not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, (2) constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause, and (3) constitutional under Congress’s Tax-
ing power.404 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor together added a fifth part to 
their concurrence declaring that the Medicaid expansion was also constitu-
tional under Congress’s Article I spending power.405 Justices Breyer and 
Kagan were not willing to join that part of the concurrence; the total vote to 
strike down the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA was 7-2.406 The 
conservative-leaning Justices, minus the Chief, filed a joint dissent.407 These 
four Justices would have struck down the ACA in its entirety.408 
                                                 
400 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01, 2608 (citations omitted). 
401 Id. 2608–09. 
402 Id. at 2608. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
405 Id. at 2575, 2609. 
406 Richard Wolf, How Health Care Law Survived, and What’s Next, USA TODAY 
(June 29, 2012, 5:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/2012-06-29-still2
_CV_U.htm (stating that the total vote to strike down the Medicaid expansion provisions 
of the ACA was 7-2). 
407 Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012) 
408 Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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TABLE 13 
ACA CASE VOTE BREAKDOWN 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius | (5-4) and (7-2) 
Justice Vote 
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority | 2-2 tie on Medicaid Expan-
sion 
Ginsburg 
Majority and Concurrence (author): the ACA is properly within 
Congress’s Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the Medi-
caid expansion is constitutional. 
Breyer 
Majority and Concurrence: the ACA is properly within Congress’s 
Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the Medicaid expan-
sion is unconstitutional coercion.  
Sotomayor 
Majority and Concurrence: the ACA is properly within Congress’s 
Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the Medicaid expan-
sion is constitutional. 
Kagan 
Majority and Concurrence: the ACA is properly within Congress’s 
Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the Medicaid expan-
sion is unconstitutional coercion. 
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-1 for dissent | 5-0 on Medicaid Ex-
pansion 
Scalia Joint Dissent (no author named): the ACA should be struck down in its entirety. 
Kennedy Joint Dissent: the ACA should be struck down in its entirety. 
Thomas Joint Dissent: the ACA should be struck down in its entirety. 
Roberts 
Majority (author): the ACA is constitutional under Congress’s tax-
ing power but not under Congress’s Commerce Clause power; the 
Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional coercion of the states. 
Alito Joint Dissent: the ACA should be struck down in its entirety. 
 
The health care cases provided the second 5-4 vote in a significant busi-
ness case over the 2011–2012 Term.409 However, it is difficult to weigh how 
this opinion will affect the business arena as some businesses will suffer and 
others will prosper. It is also likely that the Justices viewed this case more 
through the health care lens than through the business lens. Deeper analysis 
on the business angles of this opinion is an area for further research. What 
                                                 
409 Adam Liptak, Court Declines to Revisit Its Citizens United Decision, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/supreme-court-declines-to-revis
it-citizens-united.html (discussing the 5-4 Citizens United ruling). 
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this Article can state with some certainty is that Chief Justice Robert’s six-
teen-page analysis combined with the joint dissent’s analysis of the Com-
merce Clause indicates that at least five votes would prohibit the federal gov-
ernment from regulating people who are not engaged in commerce. 
Part VII infra concludes the heavy lifting of the Article by weaving togeth-
er the business impact cases to create a cohesive picture showing how this 
Term at the Roberts Court is likely to influence the business arena significantly. 
VII. FOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE TERM’S BUSINESS IMPACT 
This Article took in the big picture of the Court’s 2011–2012 Term in 
Part I.410 Each of its sixty-nine argued cases were categorized into one of 
twelve real-world, relevant policy topics. A business impact rubric was then 
implemented to cull out the cases with the most potential to impact the 
business arena. Each of these eleven cases was classified into the category 
that best described its dominant topic. These categories were: (1) intellectu-
al property, (2) employment, (3) consumer protection, (4) securities regula-
tion, and (5) health care. Parts III–VI supra presented the facts and issues 
underlying each case and evaluated the Justices’ votes and holdings from a 
business perspective.411 This Part combines these separate analyses into a 
cohesive theory on the Term’s overall impact on business. This jumping off 
point will hopefully spur additional research into this important topic. 
Notably, Part VI demonstrated that the ACA and the Term’s other 
health care cases are significant to the business arena.412 The discussion 
supra also proposed that it is unclear in what way the cases will impact 
business in the short- and long-term. While insurance company revenue 
may suffer with higher payments owed to cover sicker patients, hospitals 
stand to gain as they add patients with insurance to their roles. Some small 
businesses will receive tax credits for obtaining group insurance policies 
while larger businesses may spend more money to comply with the ACA 
employer group coverage provisions. This confusion combined with the 
breadth and diversity of non-business topics these cases addressed, and the 
inability to evaluate the Justices’ thought process in terms of business in-
terests alone, make these cases unique when compared to the other eight 
cases covered supra. Therefore, the evaluation of the health care cases in 
Part VI supra will stand on its own, and the remainder of this Section will 
cover the other eight significant business impact cases. The good news is 
twofold: (1) the analysis infra will cover only the Term’s cases that are 
                                                 
410 See supra Part I. 
411 See supra Parts III–VII. 
412 See supra Part VI. 
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directed primarily at businesses and business interests, allowing for a clearer 
picture of the impact on business; and (2) it is not difficult for the reader to 
build in an analysis of these cases by using the vote distribution table and 
other information in Part VI, adding the votes to the discussion and figures 
proposed infra. 
Four impressions stand out upon weaving these eight business impact 
cases together to form what this Article refers to as the Business Impact 
Theory of the 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term: 
1. The Court’s opinions came out strongly on the side of 
business, with business interests receiving sixty-one out of 
seventy potential votes.413 This resulted in an eighty-seven 
percent success rate for business interests over the course of 
the Term. This high percentage is different from the previous 
Term at the Roberts Court where the Justices unanimously 
voted against business interests in a handful of cases; 
2. These pro-business decisions did not occur in ordinary, run 
of the mill cases. Instead the impact of these decisions is 
magnified because they each involved topics critical to 
America’s economic recovery; 
3. Perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s liberal-leaning Justices414 
voted with the Court’s conservatives twenty-three out of a 
possible thirty-one opportunities—or seventy-four percent of 
the time—in the significant business impact cases.415 They 
                                                 
413 The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact 
cases selected this Term, but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated 
above. This left eight cases. Barring recusal, illness or vacancy there are nine Justices 
with votes in each case. Multiplying these figures together provides the Justices as a 
whole with seventy-two potential votes (nine Justices multiplied by eight cases). 
However, Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from one and Justice Kagan recused 
herself from another of the eight cases making the potential vote tally seventy. 
414 This Article classifies (in order of seniority) Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan as the Supreme Court’s liberal-leaning Justices. It classifies (in order of 
seniority) Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito as the Supreme Court’s 
conservative-leaning Justices. Although this topic could be a lengthy article in itself, 
these choices were made based on prior decisions, rationale behind such decisions, the 
author’s analysis of oral arguments from the Term, and conventional wisdom. See, e.g., 
Gilson, supra note 16, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/supreme-court-robe 
rts-obamacare-charts (showing charts depicting the ideology of recent Supreme Court 
Justices showing the liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning distinctions drawn in this 
Article are accurate); Liptak, supra note 16 (depicting the conservative nature of the 
conservative-leaning Justices as depicted in this Article). 
415 The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact 
cases selected this Term, but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated 
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did so in disputes that presented compelling arguments from 
both a conservative and liberal perspective and where such 
facts allowed for a strong four-Justice dissent. Such a split, 
however, occurred only once in the eight cases considered in 
the tally;416 
4. The Court was willing to both narrow and expand consti-
tutional provisions/amendments and state/federal statutes 
to reach its desired result. There appeared to be no con-
certed effort to adhere to a minimalist or living Constitu-
tionalist philosophy—at least in these significant business 
impact cases. 
A. This Term Was Different at the Roberts Court—At Least from a 
Business Perspective 
The eight chosen business impact cases each revolve around different 
subject matter but have enough in common to showcase a significant pro-
business theme for the Court’s 2011–2012 Term. This is a somewhat dif-
ferent outcome from the past Term where the conservative-leaning Justic-
es, alleged to be more ideologically prone to favor business, were not as 
consistently pro-business as they proved to be this Term. A recent Federal-
ist Society article describes the environment for business interests at the 
Roberts Court prior to 2011–2012: 
The statement that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts, and 
more specifically the Court majority of five Republican-appointed 
Justices, has been unusually favorable, even biased, toward business 
interests is a familiar one in the media and much-repeated .... But is this 
true? 
.... 
Not surprisingly, the issue of pro-business bias is complicated. To 
begin with, it is clear beyond dispute that none of the Justices generally 
identified as conservative—specifically, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Associate Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—is reflexively 
pro-business. In numerous cases these Justices have cast their votes for, 
and even written the majority opinions in, decisions in which business 
parties have lost and investors, consumers, or employees have won. 
                                                                                                                         
above. This left eight cases and four liberal-leaning Justices with votes in each case. 
Multiplying these figures together leads to thirty-two potential votes. However, one of the 
liberal-leaning Justices, Justice Elena Kagan, recused herself from one of the eight cases, 
making the possible vote tally equal thirty-one. 
416 The health care cases resulted in a 5-4 split, with Chief Justice Roberts joining the 
liberal-leaning Justices to form a majority. However, the health care cases are not in-
cluded in these calculations. 
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.... 
[C]laims of an automatic or even a general pro-business bias are not 
well-founded, either with respect to the five more conservative Justices 
or with respect to the Court as a whole. That the Roberts Court has 
granted certiorari in more business cases than its predecessors is often 
pointed out, but as the cases above indicate, this may well be the result 
of a recognition that there are important and outstanding issues in this 
area that need to be resolved. For those who represent business in-
terests, the Supreme Court’s more hospitable attitude toward business 
cases is welcome. However, as the above analysis demonstrates, 
business parties should expect in the Supreme Court as elsewhere that, 
if they are to prevail, they must rely on the strength and cogency of 
their arguments and not the makeup of the bench.417 
Examples of the Roberts Court rejecting the arguments of business in-
terests in prior Terms abound. In unanimous opinions issued during the 
2010–2011 Term alone, the Court (1) made it easier for securities fraud 
plaintiffs to certify a class action by not requiring them to prove loss cau-
sation at the certification stage,418 (2) allowed an employee’s Title VII re-
taliation claim to proceed against an employer not because the employee 
had engaged in protected activity but because his fiancée previously filed 
a sex discrimination complaint against the same employer,419 and (3) held 
that plaintiffs could bring securities fraud cases “based on a pharmaceuti-
cal company’s failure to disclose reports of adverse events associated with 
a product if the reports do not disclose a statistically significant number of 
adverse events.”420 Compared to the current Term, past Terms of the Rob-
erts Court have seen more business impact cases where the conservative-
leaning Justices splintered their majority421 or held their majority but split 
five to four with the liberal-leaning Justices.422 
                                                 
417 Newhouse, supra note 15 (internal citations omitted) (discussing that the Roberts 
Court overall may not be as business friendly as it is perceived). 
418 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011). 
419 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011). 
420 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011). 
421 See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1328–29 
(2011) (dealing with an anti-retaliation provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act and a 
situation where an employee filed an oral complaint about work conditions and was 
discharged; the conservative-leaning Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Roberts joined Justice 
Breyer’s majority opinion holding that the employer’s argument that oral complaints do 
not count as filed under the law was error); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct 1187, 1190, 1201 
(2009) (holding that a federal law did not preempt a state law failure to warn tort claim 
for an anti-nausea drug made by Wyeth; the conservative-leaning Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas joined the liberal-leaning Justices to form a majority). 
422 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546–47, 2561 (2011) 
(reversing 5-4 a class certification in a sex discrimination class action complaint against 
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With this recent history in mind, however, this Article demonstrates 
that the current Term cannot be classified in the same manner. The 2011–
2012 Term at the Roberts Court was much more clearly pro-business. 
There were zero unanimous opinions holding against business interests as 
compared to three in 2010–2011.423 In only one business case of the eight, 
Golan v. Holder, did a conservative-leaning Justice (Samuel Alito) leave 
the pack of five conservatives and join a liberal dissenter.424 Finally, only 
one of the eight cases, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, was decided 
with an ideological 5-4 split.425 The others were unanimously or nearly 
unanimously decided in favor of business interests.426 The following three 
Sections demonstrate the pro-business thrust of this Term in more detail. 
B. The Business Impact Decisions Favor Business in Areas Crucial to 
America’s Economic Recovery 
Each of the eight chosen business impact cases revolves around a very 
specific set of facts. For example, the Freeman case dealt specifically with 
unearned mortgage fees paid at residential real estate closings and retained 
in full by lenders.427 The outcome of the case was favorable to business; it 
impacted the plaintiffs negatively and Quicken Loans positively.428 The 
outcome was also relevant to the country’s economy and millions of 
Americans who pay fees to obtain mortgages each year. The Court’s opin-
ion interprets RESPA as blessing unearned fees as long as the lender re-
tains them in full.429 This interpretation could open the door for lenders to 
legally create and retain all sorts of new unearned mortgage fees. These 
new mortgage fees, in turn, could negatively impact the residential real 
estate market, which has been a continual drag on the nation’s economic 
recovery. The decision will obviously help drive revenue into the mortgage 
industry. Analyzed from a similar macro- and micro-economic perspective, 
                                                                                                                         
Wal-Mart involving 1.5 million current and former female employees); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743, 1753 (2011) (reversing 5-4 a Ninth Circuit de-
cision that class action waivers in mobile phone contracts are per se unconscionable un-
der the Federal Arbitration Act). 
423 See infra Table 14. 
424 See infra Table 14. 
425 See infra Table 14. 
426 See infra Table 14. The 4-4 split in Credit Suisse did not significantly change the 
pro-business outcome in the case of limiting the filing deadline for section 16(b) claims. 
The predicted split of 7-2 in Christopher, if it occurs, makes this point even stronger. 
427 Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2038 (2012). 
428 Id. at 2044. 
429 Id. 
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each of the eight business impact cases touches upon subjects crucial to 
the country’s economic recovery, and the opinion in each case favored or 
is likely to favor the business interests involved. 
One intellectual property decision from this Term favored business in-
terests in a critical aspect of the health care cost arena: generic prescription 
drugs and the process of getting these drugs to market.430 Caraco was a 
business versus business dispute; one business interest had to win and the 
other lose.431 The winner was the generic corporation over its brand name 
competitor.432 This undoubtedly pleased the businesses that filed amicus 
briefs in Caraco’s favor (Mylan Pharmaceuticals and the Generic Pharma-
ceutical Association) and disappointed the businesses favoring Novo 
Nordisk (Allergan, Inc. and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
of America).433 Overall, the holding can be considered business friendly 
because it removed obstacles in the way of a company quickly moving 
drugs to market. Business interests generally cheer when regulatory hurdles 
are lowered and efficiency improves. At the end of the day, getting pharma-
ceutical drugs into the hands of patients at a reasonable price is crucial to 
the country’s economic recovery. 
Business interests may also take satisfaction from the other intellectual 
property opinion in the Golan case. The Court’s ruling is protective of intel-
lectual property and of the idea that the marketplace can set fair prices in which 
consumers of copyrights should pay for a license. In reaching its decision, the 
majority further discussed paying fair value in the marketplace of ideas: 
The question here ... is whether would-be users must pay for their 
desired use of the author’s expression, or else limit their exploitation to 
“fair use” of that work. Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf could once be 
performed free of charge; after § 514 the right to perform it must be 
obtained in the marketplace. This is the same marketplace, of course, 
that exists for the music of Prokofiev’s U.S. contemporaries: works of 
Copland and Bernstein, for example, that enjoy copyright protection, 
but nevertheless appear regularly in the programs of U.S. concertgoers.434 
The employment law cases dealt with the hiring and firing of employ-
ees, employee retention and pay, and organized labor.435 Each of these topics 
                                                 
430 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675–76 (2012). 
431 Id. at 1678. 
432 Id. at 1680. 
433 See Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-no
vo-nordisk-as/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (showing all amicus curiae briefs filed in the case). 
434 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct 873, 893 (2012). 
435 See infra Table 15. 
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has been the subject of recent front-page news stories. Fingers remain 
crossed that business will begin to hire en masse soon. The Court took the 
opportunity to bolster employer strength throughout the employment cycle 
by allowing religious organizations to control the hiring and firing of minis-
ters,436 limit the power of organized labor,437 and avoid overtime obligations 
to pharmaceutical salespeople.438 
The consumer protection cases deal with consumer credit and residential 
real estate.439 As mentioned previously, these subjects are both part of the 
cause of the Great Recession and part of the hope for future economic re-
covery. Any recovery requires consumers to regain confidence and spend. 
Consumers, however, took the hardest hit of all over the Term. The Court 
ruled against shareholders, employees, and unions this Term, but none of 
these rulings were as lopsided as the consumer protection cases (seventeen 
to one in favor of business interests).440 The Court’s ruling in Greenwood 
allowed mandatory arbitration to count as a plaintiff’s right to sue and cor-
respondingly decreased the power of that type of statutory language.441 
Businesses gained a victory because they favor arbitration as a cheaper, less 
risky alternative to fighting a consumer lawsuit.442 The Court’s ruling in 
Freeman is likely to alter the universe of unearned mortgage fees. 
The securities regulation case revolves around the financial markets 
and corporate insiders.443 This combination formed one of the hottest top-
ics over the past few years as it does after every economic crisis.444 In 
Credit Suisse, the Court ruled in favor of underwriters and corporate insiders 
over shareholder plaintiffs.445 The Court’s narrow interpretation of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act may have larger consequences. A ruling by the Court 
allowing a longer statute of limitations on short swing lawsuits would have 
effectively ended the practice. Corporate insiders would face potential liability 
                                                 
436 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
706 (2012). 
437 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 131 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012). 
438 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2172–73 (2012). 
439 See infra Table 15. 
440 See supra Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. 
441 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669–70 (2012). 
442 Jesse J. Holland, Court Says Vioxx Lawsuit Can Proceed, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2010-04-27-merck-suit_N.htm. 
443 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417–18 (2012). 
444 See, e.g., Luigi Zingales, How Financial Regulation Can Be Market Friendly, 
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/how-finan
cial-regulation-can-be-market-friendly.html (“The structure of financial regulation in the 
U.S. resembles sedimentary rock: Each layer is the legacy of a crisis, but there is nothing 
binding the layers together.”). 
445 Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1421. 
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until two years after they file a Form 4. The Form 4 would tip off potential 
plaintiffs who would then be armed with the information and the time they 
need to sue. The Court’s ruling, on the other hand, may not hinder or dissuade 
corporate insiders from the practice of short swing trading. 
C. The Liberal-Leaning Justices Voted Consistently in Favor of 
Business Interests 
Business interests generated sixty-one out of seventy potential votes 
over the course of the 2011–2012 Term.446 Even with the five conserva-
tive-leaning Justices almost always voting in favor of business interests in 
all eight cases (minus one vote for Justice Alito’s dissent in Golan), twen-
ty-three out of a potential thirty-six liberal-leaning votes were required to 
get to the total of sixty-one.447 In fact, in six of the eight decided cases, the 
liberal-leaning Justices voted unanimously or one vote shy of unison with 
the conservative-leaning Justices.448 The only real contested cases of the 
bunch were two employment law cases: Christopher (four liberal-leaning 
dissenters) and Knox (two liberal-leaning dissenters).449 
It is important to note that these were not the type of cases where the 
business interests had a clear path to a legal victory. The lower courts did 
not make clearly erroneous interpretations of constitutional provisions or 
statutes. The cases involved facts and legal issues with compelling argu-
ments on both sides. For example, the liberal-leaning Justices could have 
easily formed a strong dissent arguing that CROA’s right to sue provision 
mandated an actual courtroom trial based on the plain English interpretation 
of that phrase. They could have argued that the First Amendment’s Ministe-
rial Exception does not cover employees who teach secular and religious 
classes and allege disability discrimination. Such unanimous dissents never 
materialized. The following table shows how little each liberal-leaning Jus-
tice voted with the conservative majority over the 2011–2012 Term. 
                                                 
446 Bear in mind that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan both recused themselves 
in one business impact case this Term. See supra Table 5 and Table 6. 
447 See infra Table 14. 
448 See infra Table 14. 
449 See infra Table 14. 
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TABLE 14 
LIBERAL-LEANING JUSTICES SIDING WITH THE CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY450 
Case Ginsburg Breyer Sotomayor Kagan 
Caraco 
Joined the  
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The Golan case provided the only strange ideological split in the group 
of business impact cases.451 Two liberal-leaning Justices disagreed upon the 
outcome with Justice Ginsburg authoring the majority452 and Justice Breyer 
authoring the dissent.453 Four of the five conservative-leaning Justices 
joined Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion while Justice Alito joined Justice 
Breyer in dissent.454 This outcome was somewhat predictable and not likely 
to repeat itself any time soon because the case involved a very odd set of 
                                                 
450 Consolidated cases are combined into one row in this table. 
451 See supra Table 14. 
452 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877 (2012). 
453 Id. at 899. 
454 Id. at 877, 899. 
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facts, a century-long gap between the intellectual property convention’s cre-
ation and the United States joining, and other various international issues. 
D. Constitutional Amendments and Statutes Were Expanded and Narrowed 
The business impact cases showed no consistent pattern when it came 
to narrowing or expanding constitutional provisions/amendments or state/fed-
eral statutes. Constitutional theory predicts that conservative-leaning Jus-
tices favor minimal constitutional and statutory expansion. Chief Justice 
Roberts reiterated this philosophy in his response to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee questionnaire, when he wrote, “Judges must be constantly 
aware that their role, while important, is limited .... They do not have a 
commission to solve society’s problems, as they see them, but simply to 
decide cases before them according to the rule of law.”455 Corresponding-
ly, theory holds that liberal-leaning Justices tend to favor a more expan-
sive approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation. Former Justice 
David Souter stated as much in a Harvard commencement address: 
The Constitution is a pantheon of values, and a lot of hard cases are 
hard because the Constitution gives no simple rule of decision for the 
cases in which one of the values is truly at odds with another. Not even 
its most uncompromising and unconditional language can resolve every 
potential tension of one provision with another, tension the Constitution’s 
Framers left to be resolved another day; and another day after that, for 
our cases can give no answers that fit all conflicts, and no resolutions 
immune to rethinking when the significance of old facts may have 
changed in the changing world. These are reasons enough to show how 
egregiously it misses the point to think of judges in constitutional cases 
as just sitting there reading constitutional phrases fairly and looking at 
reported facts objectively to produce their judgments. Judges have to 
choose between the good things that the Constitution approves, and 
when they do, they have to choose, not on the basis of measurement, 
but of meaning.456 
These judicial philosophies are drastically different. No Justice, however, 
is legally or ethically required to adopt either approach. It is perhaps unsur-
prising then that neither approach was consistently implemented this Term, 
as the remainder of this Section demonstrates. 
                                                 
455 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David E. Rosenbaum, Court Nominee Prizes ‘Modesty,’ He 
Tells the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/03/politics
/politicsspecial1/03confirm.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0. 
456 Justice David H. Souter, Text of Justice David Souter’s Speech, HARVARD GAZETTE 
(May 27, 2010), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-david-sou
ters-speech/. 
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1. Constitutional Expansion 
The 2011–2012 Term expanded First Amendment and Copyright/Pat-
ent Clause protections. In Hosanna-Tabor, the unanimous majority ex-
panded the Ministerial Exception under the Freedom of Religion Clause of 
the First Amendment.457 The Court held that the plaintiff was “the type of 
employee that a church must be free to appoint or dismiss in order to exer-
cise the religious liberty that the First Amendment guarantees.”458 The 
Court found unpersuasive the employee’s argument that this type of ruling 
would allow rampant discrimination by religious employers.459 The major-
ity argued that religious prerogatives in hiring trumped these discrimina-
tion accusations, and: 
[W]hatever the truth of the matter might be, the mere adjudication of 
such questions would pose grave problems for religious autonomy: It 
would require calling witnesses to testify about the importance and 
priority of the religious doctrine in question, with a civil factfinder 
sitting in ultimate judgment of what the accused church really believes, 
and how important that belief is to the church’s overall mission.460 
In Knox, the Court expanded an employee’s First Amendment right 
not to speak.461 The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits unions 
from forcing members to contribute to political campaigns without proper 
notice and the ability to opt in.462 In the end, the Court accepted, in a bit 
different form, the plaintiff/employees’ arguments that “strict scrutiny 
should apply to the First Amendment issues in this case because it involves 
compelled speech and political speech .... [and] that it is unconstitutional to 
compel non-members to support SEIU’s political activities related to the 
state ballot measure.”463 
The Court also expanded the scope of the Copyright and Patent Claus-
es in Golan by stating, “[n]either the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the 
First Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all cases, 
a territory that works may never exit.”464 The Court could have held that 
                                                 
457 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
707 (2012). 
458 Id. at 716. 
459 Id. at 710. 
460 Id. at 715–16. 
461 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012). 
462 Id. 
463 Ross Runkel, When Union Fees Go Up, Must a “Hudson Notice” Go Out?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 5, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=135860. 
464 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012). 
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Congress should have found more creative ways to comply with the Berne 
Convention. It could have held that the Copyright Clause does not allow 
works in the public domain to be retroactively copyrighted for the purpose 
of complying with an international convention. Alternatively, as Justice 
Breyer put it in the dissent: 
The fact that, by withdrawing material from the public domain, the statute 
inhibits an important preexisting flow of information is sufficient, when 
combined with the other features of the statute that I have discussed, to 
convince me that the Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light of the First 
Amendment, does not authorize Congress to enact this statute.465 
2. Statutory Expansion 
The majority in Caraco expanded the interpretation of federal patent law 
to allow generic manufacturers to file counterclaims challenging use codes in 
patent infringement claims.466 The Court claimed that this expansive interpre-
tation furthers a Congressional desire to speed generic drugs to market.467 A 
narrower interpretation would have denied counterclaims in cases where a 
brand name manufacturer’s use code is at least partially accurate. The Court 
stated this narrow interpretation as follows before rejecting it: 
Novo agrees that Caraco could bring a counterclaim if Novo’s assertion of 
patent protection for repaglinide lacked any basis—for example, if Novo 
held no patent, yet claimed rights to the pair of uses for which Caraco seeks 
to market its drug. But because Novo has a valid patent on a different use, 
Novo argues that Caraco’s counterclaim evaporates.468 
The majority in CompuCredit expanded the scope of CROA.469 The 
Court held that a statutory right to sue (at least when written in the required 
consumer disclosure part of the law) encompasses mandatory arbitration pro-
ceedings in lieu of heading directly to the courtroom.470 This opinion also ex-
panded the Federal Arbitration Act to incorporate cases where a plaintiff has 
a statutory right to sue.471 A narrower interpretation of that language would 
have held that a statutory right to sue should be interpreted as most Ameri-
cans would understand that phrase—a right to a trial in a courtroom. 
                                                 
465 Id. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
466 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk , 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (2012). 
467 Id. at 1681–83. 
468 Id. at 1682. 
469 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670–73 (2012). 
470 Id. 
471 Id. at 673. 
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The majority expanded the Fair Labor Standards Act and its Outside 
Salesperson exemption in Christopher.472 The majority held that pharma-
ceutical sales representatives act primarily outside the office and make 
enough money in incentive-based pay to compensate for being denied 
overtime—in a way the majority believes the FLSA intended.473 A nar-
rower interpretation of the exemption would have found that a salesperson 
must actually sell something to someone else to qualify for the exemption, 
and these pharmaceutical representatives are not legally allowed to sell 
drugs to consumers. This narrowing of the statute would have entitled the 
plaintiff/employees to overtime back pay. 
3. Statutory Narrowing 
The majority in Freeman narrowed the scope of RESPA.474 The Court 
held that the statutory language prohibited only actual fee splitting between 
two or more entities.475 This holding limits the number of lawsuits that can 
be filed under RESPA and allows lenders to charge unearned fees as long as 
they keep them.476 A more expansive interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage would have barred this practice and likely eliminated unearned mort-
gage fees that do not lead to corresponding interest rate reductions. 
Finally, the majority in Simmonds narrowed the scope of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.477 The Court held that lawsuits under 16(b) must 
be brought within two years of the date that the plaintiff knew or should 
have known of the short swing trades.478 A more expansive interpretation 
would have granted these plaintiffs more time (two years from the date 
that the corporate insider files a Form 4 detailing the short swing trade). 
The Court unanimously rejected that timeline.479 As detailed in Part V, a 
more expansive interpretation of the statute may have reduced the practice 
of short swing trades by corporate insiders unwilling to have section 16(b) 
lawsuits hanging over their heads indefinitely.480 
                                                 
472 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2172–73 (2012). 
473 Id. 
474 Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2044 (2012). 
475 Id. 
476 Id. 
477 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1419–20 (2012). 
478 Id. 
479 Id. at 1420. 
480 See supra Part V. 
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CONCLUSION 
The impact of the 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term in general will 
prove far bigger than the health care arguments and Arizona’s controver-
sial immigration case in particular. Although those cases garnered the ma-
jority of national media attention, other cases proved to be just as extraor-
dinary, precedential, and worthy of attention. The eleven business impact 
cases discussed in this Article demonstrate this conclusion. The Business 
Impact Theory articulated in this Article provided four impressions of 
these cases and their impact on the business arena. First, this Term was 
much different from past Terms where the Roberts Court issued opinions 
far less favorable to business interests. Second, business interests prevailed 
in each of the eight cases (and debatably prevailed in the health care cases). 
In cases that did not involve a business versus another business, the Court 
tended to favor business interests over the interest of shareholders, consum-
ers, unions, and employees (unless that employee was suing a union). These 
victories occurred in cases that revolved around issues crucial to any eco-
nomic recovery in the United States. Third, the liberal-leaning Justices 
agreed with their conservative-leaning colleagues the vast majority of the 
time. Justice Alito left the conservative pack of five one time (in Golan) as 
did the Chief Justice (in health care), but the conservative majority held the 
rest of the time.481 Only one of the eight analyzed business impact cases re-
sulted in an ideological 5-4 split.482 Fourth and finally, each case showed 
the Court either narrowing or expanding a constitutional provision/amend-
ment or statute to reach its result. There seemed to be very little interest in 
judicial minimalism or expansionism. 
This Article is meant to start a much-needed discussion about the impact 
of the Court’s most recent opinions on the business arena. It is important for 
both lawyers and business professionals to understand how the highest court 
in the land views their disputes in areas as important as arbitration, em-
ployment, and intellectual property protection. Also important is the gentle 
nudge this Article provides for these people to more closely monitor the 
Court and understand how its opinions are likely to treat future business is-
sues. Furthermore, it is imperative for consumers to understand how the 
Court has narrowed their statutory protections in recent years and for em-
ployees to understand their evolving rights in the workplace. In the end, this 
could be a fluky Term without a great deal of long-term meaning. On the 
other hand, this Term may provide a pivot point for the Court towards sup-
porting business interests to a greater extent. Time will tell, as the next first 
Monday of October is right around the corner. 
                                                 
481 See supra Table 14. 
482 Id. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 15 
THE SUPREME COURT’S 2011–2012 TERM AND A BUSINESS IMPACT RUBRIC 
(SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS IMPACT CASES PASSING THE RUBRIC ARE 























































































                                                 
483 Consolidated cases are combined into one row in this table. 
484 Douglas v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital and Douglas v. California Pharmacists Asso-
ciation were consolidated into and with Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern 
California. See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 (2012). 
485 Two business-related groups filed amicus briefs in this case: (1) the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America and (2) the National Association of Chain 
Drug Stores et al. See Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/maxwell-jolly-v-independent
-living-center-of-southern-california/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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486 Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
International Publishers Association et al. and (2) the Motion Picture Association of 
America. See Golan v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cas
es/golan-v-holder/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
487 One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: (1) the 
National Employment Lawyers Association. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases
/hosanna-tabor-evangelical-lutheran-church-and-school-v-eeoc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 






































































































                                                 
488 Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
Consumer Data Industry Association and (2) the Consumer Data Industry Association. 
See CompuCredit v. Greenwood, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files
/cases/compucredit-corp-v-greenwood/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 






































































































































                                                 
489 Missouri v. Frye was declared to be a companion case by the Supreme Court with 
Lafler v. Cooper. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 






















































Israel as a 














































































































ed in this case 
to the conflict 
between state 
& federal food 
























this case to the 
conflict be-
tween state & 
federal railroad 
safety laws) | 
Locomotive 
Inspection Act 
                                                 
490 One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: (1) the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. See National Meat Association 
v. Harris, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-meat-asso
ciation-v-brown/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
491 Eight business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Griffin 
Wheel Company, (2) the Association of American Railroads, (3) ThyssenKrupp Budd 
Company, (4) the National Association of Manufacturers, (5) General Electric Corporation, 
(6) John Crane Inc., (7) the Chamber of Commerce, and (8) the National Association of 
Retired and Veteran Railway Employees. See Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kurns-v-railroad-friction-prod
ucts-corp/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 


















































































                                                 
492 Four business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
National Consumer Law Center et al., (2) ACA International, (3) the National Federation 
of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and (4) DBA International. See 
Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case
-files/cases/mims-v-arrow-financial-services-llc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
493 Fifteen business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
American Land Title Association et al., (2) the American Escrow Association et al., (3) the 
National Association of Title Agents, (4) the Real Estate Services Provider’s Council, 
Inc., (5) Stewart Information Services Corporation et al., (6) the National Association of 
Home Builders, (7) the California Building Industry Association, (8) the National Association 
of Retail Collection Attorneys, (9) Experian Information Solutions, Inc., (10) Facebook, 
Inc. et al., (11) ACA International Law, (12) the American Land Title Association, (13) the 
Association of Global Automakers, Inc., (14) the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, 
and (15) the Consumer Data Industry Association. See First American Financial v. Edwards, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/first-american-financial-corp-v
-edwards/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
































































































                                                 
494 One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: the Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States of America. See Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/credit-suisse-securities-v-sim
monds/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 








































































                                                 
495 Seven business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., (2) the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, (3) Allergan, Inc. et al., 
(4) the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, (5) TEVA Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc., (6) the Consumer Federation of America et al., and (7) Apotex, Inc. See Caraco 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/case-files/cases/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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496 Ten business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Arup 
Laboratories, Inc., and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, (2) a combined 
brief for Verizon Communications, Inc., and Hewlett Packard Company, (3) a combined 
brief for Microsoft Corporation, EMC Corporation, and Intel Corporation, (4) Roche 
Molecular Systems, Inc. et al., (5) Novartis Corporation, (6) Genomic Health, Inc. et al., 
(7) National Venture Capital Association, (8) SAP America, Inc., (9) the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America, and (10) Myriad Genetics, Inc. See Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.sco
tusblog.com/case-files/cases/mayo-collaborative-services-v-prometheus-laboratories-inc/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
497 Three business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Freeport-
McMoran Corporation et al., (2) the American Petroleum Institute et al., and (3) the Edison 
Electric Institute et al. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.sco
tusblog.com/case-files/cases/ppl-montana-llc-v-montana/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
498 Perry v. Perez and Perry v. Davis were consolidated into and with Perry v. Perez. 
See Perry v. Perez,132 S. Ct. 934, 934 (2012). 
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499 Nine business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
National Association of Home Builders et al., (2) the National Institute of Manufacturers, 
(3) the Wet Wet Weather Partnership et al., (4) the American Petroleum Institute et al., 
(5) the American Farm Bureau Federation et al., (6) a combined brief filed for the Center 
for Constitutional Jurisprudence and the National Federation of Independent Business 
Small Business Legal Center, (7) the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, (8) the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and (9) General Electric Co. See Sackett 
v. Environmental Protection Agency, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files
/cases/sackett-et-vir-v-environmental-protection-agency-et-al/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
500 Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Intel Corp. 
et al., and (2) Verizon Communications Inc. et al. See Kappos v. Hyatt, SCOTUSBLOG, http://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kappos-v-hyatt/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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501 One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. See Knox v. Service 
Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files
/cases/knox-v-service-employees-intl-union-local-1000/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
502 Six business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Grapevine 
Imports LTD, (2) Daniel S. Burks and Reynolds Properties, L.P., (3) Bausch & Lomb 
Incorporated, (4) the National Association of Home Builders, (5) a combined brief filed for 
the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and Cato 
Institute, and (6) Utam, Ltd. and DSDBL, Ltd. See United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply, LLC, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v
-home-concrete-supply-llc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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503 Holder v. Gutierrez was consolidated with Holder v. Sawyers. See Holder v. Martinez 
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2016–17 (2012). 
504 Three business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
American Bankers Association et al., (2) the American Escrow Association et al., (3) the 
National Association of Realtors. See Freeman v. Quicken Loans Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/tammy-foret-freeman-et-al-v-quicken-loans
-inc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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505 Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
American Petroleum Institute et al., and (2) KBR, Inc. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Au-
thority, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mohamad-v-rajoub/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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506 The Court linked Miller v. Alabama with Jackson v. Hobbes for the 2011–2012 
Term. See Jackson v. Hobbes, 132 S. Ct. 548, 548 (2011) (mem.) (granting certiorari in 
Jackson v. Hobbes and stating that Jackson “is to be argued in tandem with No. 10-9646, 
Miller v. Alabama”). 
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507 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida was linked by the Court 
with National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and Florida v. Department 
of Health and Human Services. See (Order List: 565 U.S.), SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PDFs/022112zor
.pdf (“Upon consideration of the motions pertaining to the allocation of oral argument 
time, the following allocation of oral argument time is adopted. On the Anti-Injunction 
Act issue (No. 11-398), the Court-appointed amicus curiae is allotted 40 minutes, the 
Solicitor General is allotted 30 minutes, and the respondents are allotted 20 minutes. On 
the Minimum Coverage Provision issue (No. 11-398), the Solicitor General is allotted 60 
minutes, respondents Florida, et al. are allotted 30 minutes, and respondents National 
Federation of Independent Business, et al. are allotted 30 minutes. On the Severability 
issue (Nos. 11-393 and 11-400), the petitioners are allotted 30 minutes, the Solicitor 
General is allotted 30 minutes, and the Court-appointed amicus curiae is allotted 30 
minutes. On the Medicaid issue (No. 11-400), the petitioners are allotted 30 minutes, and 
the Solicitor General is allotted 30 minutes.”). 
508 Eight business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) a com-
bined brief filed for the Service Employees International Union and Change to Win, (2) a 
combined brief filed for the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, (3) a combined brief filed for the Small Business Majority Foundation and the 
Main Street Alliance, (4) the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, (5) Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, (6) America’s Health 
Insurance Plans, (7) the American Hospital Association, and (8) the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of America. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v. 
Florida, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/u-s-department-of
-health-and-human-services-v-florida/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
























































































                                                 
509 Seven business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the 
National Employment Lawyers Association, (2) Medical Professionals, (3) a Certified Class 
of Pharmaceutical Representatives from Johnson & Johnson, (4) the Pharmaceutical Rep-
resentatives, (5) Chamber of Commerce, (6) the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness, and (7) the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. See Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases
/christopher-v-smithkline-beecham-corp/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
510 Dorsey v. United States was consolidated with Hill v. United States. See Dorsey v. 
United States, 132. S. Ct. 759, 759 (2011) (mem.). 
511 One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: a combined 
brief filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the National Defense 
Industrial Association. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, SCOTUSBLOG, http://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/salazar-v-ramah-navajo-chapter/ (last visited Mar. 
23, 2013). 























































































                                                 
512 One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: the Loan 
Syndications and Trading Association et al. See RadLAX v. Gateway Hotel, LLC v. 
Amalgamated Bank, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/radlax
-gateway-hotel-llc-v-amalgamated-bank/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
513 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchakwas was con-
solidated by the Court with Salazar v. Patchak. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 845, 845 (2012) (mem.). 
514 Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the Service 
Employees International Union et al., and (2) the American Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations. See Arizona v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/case-files/cases/arizona-v-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
